Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 21

Issue 3

Article 5

4-15-1994

Split-Recovery: A Constitutional Answer to the Punitive Damage
Dilemma
Clay R. Stevens

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Remedies Commons,
Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Clay R. Stevens Split-Recovery: A Constitutional Answer to the Punitive Damage Dilemma, 21 Pepp. L. Rev.
Iss. 3 (1994)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol21/iss3/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Split-Recovery: A Constitutional Answer
to the Punitive Damage Dilemma

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past 150 years, the United States judicial system has followed
the eighteenth century English tradition of allowing punitive damage
awards.' As early as 1852, the United States Supreme Court expressly
recognized the validity of punitive damages as an available remedy
above and beyond compensation for loss.' Although punitive damages
exceed the plaintiffs actual loss, their continued application in cases
involving fraud, malice, or oppression is justifiable for the sake of the
community.' Additionally, modem American judicial decisions extend
the application of punitive damages to conduct by defendants that is
outrageous, malicious, reckless, or willful and wanton.'
While widely recognized for many years, punitive damages have been
the subject of frequent criticism.' This criticism has increased dramati-

1. Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages
in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 34 (1985). Modernly, all but five
states "recognize the practice of awarding punitive damages in civil cases." Id. at 4
n.9. These five states are Louisiana, Nebraska, Massachusetts, Washington and Indiana. Id.
2. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia observed that "lilt is a well-established principle of the common
law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may
inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant.'"
Id. (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852)).
3. Id. at 25. Justice Scalia quoted from an influential 19th Century treatise by
Theodore Sedgwick stating that in cases "'where gross fraud, malice, or oppression
appears, the jury are not bound to adhere to the strict line of compensation, but
may, by a severer verdict, at once impose a punishment on the defendant and hold
up an example to the community.'" Id. (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF
DAMAGES 522 (4th ed. 1868)).
4. James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages: State Extraction Practice Is Subject to
Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 119, 120 (1990) (arguing that
courts may award punitive damages if the defendant's action results from outrageous,
malicious, reckless, or willful and wanton conduct).
5. Theodore B. Olsen & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Constitutional Restraints on
the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 908 (1990) ("Since its virtual

cally because of a recent increase in punitive damage awards.7 This
increase has caused many critics to call for the complete abolition of
punitive damages.8 While the arguments against awarding punitive damages may be legitimate,9 the history and established tradition of awarding punitive damages is so deeply rooted in the American judiciary that
its complete abolition is unlikely."° Cognizant of this reality, many of
these same critics have instead focused on other less drastic methods
of tort reform."
Concerned with rising punitive damage awards,' 2 advocates of tort
reform have proposed "absolute limits on punitive damages, proportional caps based on compensatory damages, and more recently, 'splitrecovery' provisions that allow the state to claim a portion of any punitive damages awarded." 3 While all of these reform methods have re-

inception in the United States, the judiciary has criticized punitive damage awards as
a disruptive and distorting component of the justice system.").
6. Sharon G. Burrows, Comment, Apportioning a Piece of a Punitive Damage
Award to the State: Can State Extraction Statutes Be Reconciled with Punitive Damage Goals and the Takings Clause?, 47 U. MiAMi L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1992) (noting
that "the apparently dramatic increase in the number and dollar amount of punitive
damage awards over the last several decades has fueled a debate over the propriety
of allowing punitive damages").
7. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Arguing against excessive
punitive damage awards, Justice O'Connor stated that the amounts awarded in punitive damage claims have "skyrocketed" more than 30 times in the past 10 years. Id.
(noting an increase in the highest award from $250,000 to $10,000,000).
8. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
9. This Comment will not address the age-old debate about the soundness of
punitive damages, but will presume that punitive damages will continue to be a part
of the United States judicial system.
10. John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV.
870, 889 (1976). Political realities indicate that the "vigor of the plaintiffs' bar, the
prevailing sympathetic temperaments of many state and federal judges, the
disproportionately heavy representation of plaintiff attorneys in state legislatures and
the United States Congress, and the tradition of two hundred years or so will not
soon be overcome." Id. The Supreme Court's reluctance to overturn unduly excessive
punitive damage awards evidences the long-standing tradition inherent in punitive
damage recovery. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2720 (1993) (upholding a punitive damage recovery 526 times greater than compensatory damages).
11. 2 JAMES D. GIIIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE
§ 21.08 (1984 & Supp. 1993) (stating that advocates of complete abolition often realize the political realities of the situation and suggest less drastic reforms).
12. Burrows, supra note 6, at 439 ("This tort reform crusade is a legislative response to the fear that tort liability has expanded too far. Critics have attacked punitive damages in particular as an unregulated and growing menace to our economy
and our civil justice system.").
13. Recent Case, Eighth Amendment-Punitive Damages-FloridaSupreme Court
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ceived considerable attention as of late, split-recovery, in particular, has
risen in prominence since its introduction in the mid-1980s." Split-recovery denotes the practice of allocating a portion of a punitive damage
award to someone other than the plaintiff.'5 Since the introduction of
split-recovery, ten states have passed split-recovery statutes in one form
or another. Three other states have split-recovery proposals pending

Upholds "Split-Recovery" Statute-Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (Per
Curiam), 106 HARv. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (1993) [hereinafter Eighth Amendment]. Another suggested reform advocates a zero percent system in which the plaintiff receives
none of the punitive damage recovery. E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A
Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 856-57 (1993). Under this system, the
court bifurcates the trial after a successful determination of compensatory damages
and dismisses the plaintiff from the proceedings. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs attorney
argues the punitive damage claim in the name of the government and receives a
small percentage of any award. Id. While this proposal addresses many of the same
problems and questions encountered by split-recovery, the government's extended role
in the subsequent suit raises constitutional issues under the Double Jeopardy and
Excessive Fines Clauses. See infra notes 182-245 and accompanying text.
14. Justice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of
Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 90 (1992). In
1987, the American Bar Association introduced a proposal to award a portion of
punitive damage awards to "public purposes" as a method of tort reform. Id. Although brought to public attention in 1987, the concept of split-recovery arose at
least as early as 1983. Robert H. Arnold, Punitive Damages in Product Liability
Litigation: Redirecting the Windfall, 6 J. PROD. LLkB. 367, 374 (1983) (suggesting a
proposal granting the state a 90% share of any punitive damages awarded).
15. While this Comment uses the term "split-recovery," other commentators differ
on terminology. See, e.g., James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage
Windfall Away from the Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1130, 1139 (1992)
(restricted recovery plan); Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 119 (state extraction); Eighth
Amendment, supra note 13, at 1691 (split-recovery); Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split
Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages,
28 VAL U. L. REV. 473, 473 (1993) (split award); Paul F. Kirgis, Note, 77w Constitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards, 50 WAsii. & LEE L. REV.
843, 843 (1993) (state allocation).
16. As of 1993, ten states had enacted split-recovery statutes: Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New York, Oregon, and Utah. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West Supp.
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 668A.1.2.b (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675.2 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. § 8701(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c) (1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992).
In addition, the Alabama Supreme Court has recognized such a split-recovery
proposal as implicit under the powers granted the judiciary. Smith v. States Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Ala. 1992) (holding punitive damage distribution of

in their legislatures. 7
The growth of split-recovery statutes has caused many to question
the necessity, efficiency, equity and constitutionality of these laws. This
Comment addresses these concerns. Section II examines the goals of
punitive damages and demonstrates that split-recovery statutes are
consistent with the public policy objectives of punitive damages.2 8
Section III explores the policy rationale for split-recovery and refutes
the contention that these statutes do not serve a legitimate and necessary societal purpose." Section IV analyzes the constitutionality of the
statutes.0 Section V surveys the specific provisions of the split-recovery statutes under scrutiny.2' Finally, this Comment proposes a model
split-recovery statute which not only functions equitably and efficiently,
but passes constitutional muster.22

II.

PURPOSES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

An examination of the rationale behind punitive damages clarifies the
legitimacy of split-recovery statutes and indicates that such statutes are
consistent with the purposes of punitive damages.' Punitive damages
serve at least five public policy purposes: deterrence of similar egregious acts by the defendant and others in the future, 4 punishment of
the defendant for his wrongdoing,0 incentive for plaintiffs to bring
claims on the society's behalf," compensation for non-pecuniary losses
to the victim,27 and compensation for attorney's fees.' While commen-

half to the plaintiff and half to the American Medical Association constitutional).
17. Andrew Blum, States Want Share of Punitives; Three More Join Trend, NAT'L

L.J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 3 (Texas, Indiana, and New Jersey have split-recovery proposals
pending in their legislature).
18. See infra notes 23-73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 96-245 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 246-96 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 297-339 and accompanying text.
23. Many critics attack split-recovery extraction statutes as violating the general
purposes behind punitive damages. Burrows, supra note 6, at 448 (split-recovery statutes fail to promote the goals of punitive damages and instead serve as a political
tool favoring businesses).
24. Shores, supra note 14, at 69. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
25. Shores, supra note 14, at 69. See i7(fra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
26. Shores, supra note 14, at 74. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
27. Shores, supra note 14, at 74. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
28. Burrows, supra note 6, at 447 (compensation theory of punitive damages includes litigation-related expenses). See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
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tators universally recognize and accept the first three purposes,n they
hotly debate the legitimacy of the latter two?0
A.

Punishment and Deterrence

An award of full compensation to an injured party in a civil suit often
fails to provide sufficient deterrence and punishment to prevent future
reoccurrence of the reprehensible act. 1 In such cases, punitive damage
awards that allow for recovery beyond the value of the compensatory
award serve to fully punish the defendant for committing the egregious
act and discourage the defendant or others from engaging in similar
conduct in the future.' In addition, publicity surrounding the recovery
of punitive damage awards also serves to deter reoccurrences of the
egregious behavior.Y
Taken at face value, split-recovery statutes that allocate a portion of
punitive damage awards to an individual other than the plaintiff do not
appear to dilute the punishment or deterrent effects of punitive damages because the total damage award owed by the defendant wrongdoer

29. The Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the judiciary of most
states, clearly identifies deterrence and punishment as legitimate purposes of punitive
damages. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that punitive damages are levied to "punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence"); Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021, 1024 (Ala. 1992)
(stating that the main goals of punitive damages are vindication and deterrence); Kirk
v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 266, 274 (Colo. 1991) (majority and dissenting
opinions agreeing that punishment and deterrence are the primary goals of punitive
damages).
Legal scholars also agree as to deterrence and punishment aspects of punitive
damages. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1135 (stating that legal scholars "stand in virtual
unanimity that punitive damage awards serve the purpose of either punishment or
deterrence").
30. See infra notes 39-73 and accompanying text.
31. James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (1984) (noting that "the judicial
system needs punitive damages to deter socially harmful, loss creating conduct by defendants"). To be reprehensible to society and bring rise to a punitive damage claim,
the act complained of must involve willful and wanton behavior, malice, moral turpitude, or outrageous conduct. Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1950) (en banc)
(holding constitutional a libel statute limiting punitive damages).
32. Burrows, supra note 6, at 444 ("The imposition of punitive damages punishes
the defendant for committing some socially undesirable act, while discouraging similar
conduct in the future by the defendant and others.").
33. Shores, supra note 14, at 69.

is unaffected.' Some commentators suggest this appearance is illusory
because split-recovery statutes diminish the plaintiff's incentive to bring
suit.' However, the proper allocation of a punitive award under a splitrecovery statute does not eliminate the plaintiffs incentive to sue.' In
fact, where the advent of punitive damages may result in
overdeterrence of tort-feasors,37 split-recovery may actually lead to a
more efficient level of deterrence.' Therefore, split-recovery will not
diminish the deterrence and punishment effects of punitive damages.
B.

Incentive to Sue

Punitive damages provide an appropriate incentive for private plaintiffs to bring suit.' To preserve the legal and community norms of societyi the public as a whole has an interest in preventing those who
recklessly injure others or who commit socially unacceptable acts from
escaping punishment.' Without punitive damages, however, plaintiffs

34. Burrows, supra note 6, at 444 ("Because the defendant must still pay the full
amount of the punitive damage award, the provisions of the statute appear not to
reduce the level of punishment and deterrence that the defendant would receive were
the money to go to the claimant rather than the state.").
35. Id. at 446-47. If split-recovery reduces the incentive for all plaintiffs to bring
suit, a potential reduction in the primary goals of deterrence and punishment occurs
because some victims with worthy claims will not bring suit and the wrongdoers will
go unpunished. Id. 36. See ivqfra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
37. Grube, supra note 13, at 852 n.63 (noting that the potential for punitive damages can lead to overaggressive plaintiffs and an inefficient level of deterrence). The
potential for increased settlement recovery with punitive damage claims causes this
overdeterrence. Sales & Cole, supra note 31, at 1156 ("A byproduct of the continued
success that plaintiffs have experienced in obtaining large punitive damage awards is
the now universal practice of plaintiffs alleging and demanding punitive damages in
an effort to increase the ultimate recovery from juries, and to compel defendants to
settle meritless cases because of the fear that a jury will return an outrageous punitive damage award.").
38. By creating the proper level of incentive for plaintiffs to bring worthy claims,
split-recovery may lead to a more efficient number of suits and the proper level of
deterrence to potential tortfeasors. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
However, even when inefficient, the outrageousness of the conduct leading to punitive
damage recovery may lead society to favor overdeterrence. RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 194 (3d ed. 1986) (noting that society "may want to make
sure that I am not indifferent between stealing and buying my neighbor's car" by
imposing excess punishment on the thief).
39. Grube, supra note 13, at 851 ("Society pays punitive damages to plaintiffs as
an incentive for them to perform this service.").
40. See Breslo, supra note 15, at 1151 n.84 ("The private plaintiff is seen as performing a public service by litigating the issue, with the benefits of the litigation
flowing not only to the plaintiff but also to society."); Burrows, supra, note 6, at 446
(encouragement of lawsuits against those who commit socially undesirable acts is
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with socially desirable suits might not undertake the litigation when the
cases involve either extremely high degrees of emotional and financial
stress41 or the potential for only minimal financial benefit. 2 By allowing the potential of punitive damages, society can insure that all private
plaintiffs have the proper incentive to bring publicly beneficial suits.'
Punitive damages also induce injured individuals to become plaintiffs by
rewarding them for their efforts in the litigation process.'
Split-recovery statutes that allocate a portion of punitive damage
awards to one other than the plaintiff appear to negate the incentive
rationale behind awarding punitive damages.45 However, these statutes
do not hinder the effectiveness of punitive damages because a victim
who receives full compensation through compensatory damages has the
incentive to sue without full recovery of a punitive damage award.' In

society's best method for enforcing societal norms).
41. Burrows, supra note 6, at 446.
42. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1151 (stating that "without the prospect of a punitive
award, worthy claims with litigation costs that exceed the potential recovery would

not be brought"); Grube, supra note 13, at 846 (these plaintiffs bring those
wrongdoers to justice who may otherwise go unpunished). The potential for such
problems is likely in worthy claims that are socially and personally significant but
only have minimal compensatory damages. Id. (stating that punitive damages are
particularly important in cases involving only nominal monetary damages).
43. Ausness, supra note 1, at 69 ("[T]he prospect of punitive damages encourages
private persons to enforce societal norms through civil litigation . . ").
44. Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021, 1024 (Ala. 1992) (stating
that because the plaintiff "has expended considerable effort in exposing and prosecuting Defendants' conduct .... it would be inappropriate to deprive [the] Plaintiff of a
substantial recovery in this case").
45. Burrows, supra note 6, at 447. By reducing the potential monetary recovery
from bringing suit, split-recovery statutes "greatly minimize an injured victim's incentive to sue . . . ." Id.

46. Many economists have argued that punitive damages are completely unnecessary for this purpose because the potential for full compensation creates sufficient
incentive to bring suit. Grube, supra note 13, at 846-47. Even those who argue that
punitive damages are necessary to maintain the proper level of deterrence must acknowledge that the plaintiff need not necessarily receive the entire punitive damage
award to give her incentive to bring suit. Because juries assess punitive damages
based upon defendants' reckless conduct and not plaintiffs' costs or inconvenience, a
reduced award may or may not provide sufficient incentive to encourage the plaintiff
to bring suit. See Breslo, supra note 15, at 1135. However, by allowing the legislature
to set the amount of state appropriation, the state can effectively determine the
amount of recovery necessary to effectuate the proper incentive to sue. See infra

note 312 and accompanying text. The Missouri split-recovery statute illustrates this
principle, as it was enacted under the belief that the "plaintiffs should receive only

addition, full recovery of punitive damages may provide too great an
incentive and lead to inefficient and undesirable levels of litigation.47
For these reasons, a proper allocation of a punitive damage award between the plaintiff and society under a split-recovery statute will not
negate the incentive function of punitive damages.
C.

Compensationfor Non-pecuniary Losses

Another rationale proposed by punitive damage advocates suggests
that punitive damage awards serve to compensate victims for typically
non-pecuniary injury.' The basis behind the rationale for compensation is that punitive damages compensate for those damages that are
particularly difficult to ascertain and not generally recoverable through
compensatory damages.49 While compensatory damages may fail to
compensate a victim completely for her actual loss, the majority of
legal scholars disagree with the use of punitive damages to accomplish
this purpose.' The Supreme Court has also expressly disavowed the
compensation rationale behind punitive damages.'
so much of the award as is necessary to give them incentive to assert justified punitive damage claims." Breslo, supra note 15, at 1134. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675.2
(Supp. 1992).
47. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1130 (stating that full recovery of punitive damages
"stimulate[s] excessive and unnecessary litigation"); Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1183 (1931) ("[Iunadvisedly severe admonition in many cases may be too great a price to pay for the prosecution of a few
wrongdoers who might otherwise escape.").
48. Shores, supra note 14, at 74. At common law, compensation was a major justification for punitive damage awards because compensatory damages did not include
recovery for insult, suffering, mental anguish, or other non-pecuniary losses. Sloane,
supra note 15, at 481. However, expansion of compensatory damages to include recovery for pain and suffering, mental distress, and hedonic damages decreased the
need for punitive damages to serve this gap-filling function. Id. at 481-82. Yet, some
commentators still maintain that compensatory damages significantly undercompensate
for actual damages. Burrows, supra note 6, at 447.
49. Inured plaintiffs often "suffer damage to emotional tranquillity, family harmony
and employment security that is particularly difficult to prove and generally not compensable anyway." David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1298 (1976). See also Burrows, supra note 6, at 447
(noting that the compensation theory includes any additional uncompensated mental
anguish resulting from the defendant's actions).
50. See Breslo, supra note 15, at 1135 (legal scholars "stand in virtual unanimity
that punitive damage awards serve the purpose of either punishment or deterrence,
but not compensation"); see also Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1237 (S.D.
Iowa 1991) (noting that punitive damages "are in no way intended to be compensatory"); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Pocess, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975, 1005 (1989) (same). But see Burrows, supra note 6, at 451 (proposing that
the judiciary has implicitly recognized the compensatory function of punitive damages
for many years).
51. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). The Court clearly enunci-
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Scholars and the judiciary enunciate three reasons for their distaste
for the compensation rationale.' First, using punitive damages to compensate victims for losses not recovered through compensatory damages is inefficient because courts base punitive damage assessments on
the defendant's conduct rather than the plaintiffs need for compensation.' Second, the compensation rationale discriminates against plaintiffs who do not incur punitive damage type harm because only those
victims who incur such harm will be eligible for "full" compensation
through punitive damages.' Finally, punitive damages circumvent the
current system of compensatory damages by allowing victims who are
being compensated for all damages for which the legislature chooses to
compensate them to recover this additional compensation.' For these
reasons, the compensation argument behind punitive damages is illusory, and an examination of the effect of split-recovery on this purpose is
unnecessary.'

ated that punitive damages do not compensate for injury. Id. "Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." Id.
52. See Ausness, supra note 1, at 68-69 (the ad hoc method of assessment for
punitive damages and the inequality of 'fully' compensating victims only in punitive
damage claims are two possible reasons); Grube, supra note 13, at 852-53 (the judicial attempt to circumvent current compensatory statutes is another objection to the
compensation function).
53. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1137-38 (most states do not instruct the jury to base
their punitive damage allocation on the actual injury or expenses incurred, but instead instruct the jury to make their determination based upon the defendant's
wealth). Because courts do not instruct juries to base a punitive damage award on
the actual injury incurred by the victim, the award is likely to result in either excess
or insufficient compensation for the plaintiff. Id.
54. Ausness, supra note 1, at 68. On the contrary, some scholars suggest that the
difference between the harm suffered by punitive damage claimants and non-punitive
damage claimants justifies the discrimination. See Burrows, supra note 6, at 447. For
example, the malicious conduct behind punitive damages often causes a stronger
sense of violation, outrage, and degradation, not present in non-punitive damage type
claims, and worthy of compensation. Id.
55. Grube, supra note 13, at 852-53. If plaintiffs are truly under-compensated, a
revision of the tort system better serves the judicial system than allowing the courts
to address the need through the arbitrary allocation of punitive damages. Id. See also
Breslo, supra note 15, at 1138.
56. Even if the effects of split-recovery statutes on the compensation purpose of
punitive damages were at issue, whether the statutes diminish such a purpose is
unclear because punitive damages do not bear any relationship to the amount of nonpecuniary loss. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. For example, if a punitive
damage claim exceeded the amount of non-pecuniary loss, awarding a portion of the

While the compensation function of punitive damages is illusory,
compensation remains a part of any punitive damage award. Punitive
damages depend on compensatory damages because a punitive damage
claim is only litigable if brought concurrently with an underlying claim
for compensatory damages. 7 Additionally, courts in some states instruct juries to consider the severity of injury and harm to the victim
when determining the amount of a punitive damage award.' Split-recovery, however, will not effect this limited role of compensation in a
punitive damage claim because the statutes do not affect the distribution of the punitive damage award until after the allocation of the
award.'
D.

Compensationfor Litigation Expenses

The final rationale proposed for punitive damages stems from the
high cost of litigating most civil suits. Unlike the English system, where
losing parties are responsible for all attorney's fees,' the United States
judicial system does not typically reimburse victorious parties for litigation expenses incurred in bringing suit.6 Because attorneys' fees alone
often account for more than one-third of a potential recovery,' the
victorious party, who society intends to fully compensate for injury, still
incurs substantial loss.' Some commentators use this deprivation as a

windfall to one other than the plaintiff would not diminish the compensation function. Only where the entire punitive damage award did not fully compensate the
plaintiff, or the allocation of the award caused the punitive award to fail to meet the
non-pecuniary loss, would the split-recovery statute frustrate this illusory compensation purpose.
57. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (stating that a punitive damage claim is auxiliary to a compensatory claim).
58. Id. at 266 (noting that a punitive damage claim "contemplates that the trier of
fact will fix the award only after giving due consideration to the severity of the injury perpetuated on the injured party by the wrongdoer").
59. Burrows, supra note 6, at 457 (stating that a state or agency takes no interest
in a punitive damage allocation under a split-recovery statute until the issuance of a
judgment).
60. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570-71 (1993) (describing

generally the English system of awarding attorney costs).
61. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1136. Commentators speculate on several possible
rationales for this exclusion: the fear that attorneys would charge exorbitant legal
fees if imposed on opposing parties; the desire not to punish parties for honestly
contesting or bringing a reasonable suit; and the confusion, in many cases, as to the
prevailing party. Id.
62. Owen, supra note 49, at 1297.
63. Ausness, supra note 1, at 68 (noting that because of the high costs of litiga-

tion, "verdicts that do not include an award of attorneys' fees usually leave the victim in worse financial condition than before his injury").
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justification for imposing punitive damages.' Thus, by making claims
less remunerative to the plaintiff, split-recovery frustrates this proposed
function.'
While split-recovery admittedly hinders the ability of the plaintiff to
offset her litigation expenses, most courts and legal scholars do not
regard this as a legitimate legislative objective of punitive damages.'
As with non-pecuniary losses, using punitive damages as a gap-filler for
litigation expenses is both inefficient ' and inequitable.' If compensation for litigation expenses is a legitimate objective of the legislature,
the state can employ better methods for achieving their purpose. Instead of indirectly compensating for litigation expenses through punitive damages, the state should order reimbursement for prevailing parties regardless of their role in the dispute' or the nature of their
70
case.
In considering a split-recovery statute's effect on the objectives behind punitive damages, a determination of each objective's legitimacy is
necessary. Split-recovery statutes do not diminish the overall effectiveness of the widely recognized purposes of punitive damages: punishment, deterrence, and incentive to sue." As for the two compensation
purposes behind punitive damages, most courts and scholars disavow

64. See, e.g., Burrows, supra note 6, at 447; Ausness, supra note 1, at 68-69;
Owen, supra note 49, at 1297. But see Jeffrey W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of
Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241, 304-05 (1985) (criticizing the proposition of using punitive damages to compensate for litigation costs).
65. Burrows, supra note 6, at 448. See Sloane, supra note 15, at 482.
66. See supra note 51 (emphasizing that punitive damages do not serve a legitimate compensatory function).
67. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that punitive damages do not
efficiently serve to compensate because courts base their award on the defendant's
conduct rather than the plaintiff's loss).
68. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1136. Using punitive damages to compensate for litigation expense is "unfair to defendants-who do not have a similar mechanism-and

to other plaintiffs who are not fortunate enough to have a suit that the law deems
worthy of special punitive damages." Id. To compare this with the policy rationale
against using punitives to compensate for non-pecuniary losses, see supra notes 52-56
and accompanying text.
69. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1136 (maintaining that "a proper plan for reimbursing
litigation costs would allow victorious parties, regardless of their role in the litigation,
to recover their costs").
70. Grube, supra note 13, at 864 ("If full compensation is the concern, however,
plaintiffs should be awarded litigation costs in all suits-whether or not punitive
liability is proven.").
71. See supra notes 3147 and accompanying text.

their underlying rationale."2 Even accepting these purposes as legitimate, allocation of punitive damages does not effectively, efficiently, or
equitably serve to compensate for loss or for expense." Therefore,
split-recovery is consistent with the public policy objectives behind
punitive damages.

III.

PURPOSES OF SPLIT-RECOVERY

Assuming that punitive damages will continue to be assessed against
civil defendants for malicious or reckless conduct," several notable
jurists and scholars question whether allocating a portion of the punitive damage award to someone other than the plaintiff better serves the
interests of justice.' Under the traditional tort system used in most
jurisdictions, a plaintiff receives not only recovery for her injury, but
the entire punitive damage award." Because the plaintiffs recovery
damages, she often appears to receive
exceeds her actual compensatory
77
an undeserved windfall.

72. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
75. Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021, 1028 (Ala. 1992) (Shores,
J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that eminent jurists and scholars such as Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Dean Robert McKay suggest that allocating a portion of a punitive award to one other than the plaintiff better serves the interests of justice).
76. Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1699, 1721
(1987) ("Courts have historically imposed punitive damages to punish a culpable defendant."). The only states that prevent a plaintiff from recovering the full punitive
damage award are those that disavow any punitive damage recovery and those that
apportion a part of the recovery to the state. See infra note 118 (listing the five
states that do not allow any punitive damage recovery); supra note 16 (listing the
ten states with split-recovery statutes).
77. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1134 n.15. See Grube, supra note 13, at 862.
In fact, some jurists suggest that the plaintiff receives the undeserved windfall
"simply because there is no one else to receive it." Shepherd Components, Inc. v.
Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991). However, the
plaintiff is not completely undeserving because she must expend time, effort, and
money as the catalyst who brings the defendant to justice for the sake of society.
See Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 272 (Colo. 1991) (noting that the
judgment against the defendant "results exclusively from the [plaintifts] time, effort,
and expense in the litigation process without any assistance whatever from the
state"). Therefore, an allocation of the entire punitive damage award to one other
than the plaintiff would also be an injustice.
For a more detailed analysis of the windfall recovery problem of punitive damages, see infra text accompanying note 84, and infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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While most jurists and scholars acknowledge this windfall,' they
accept it as a necessary consequence of using punitive damages to further society's goals of punishment and deterrence.'9 However, economically these windfalls detract from the usefulness of punitive damages
because they create an inefficient allocation of resources and promote
frivolous lawsuits by encouraging plaintiffs to take risks in pursuing unnecessary litigation.' Split-recovery, on the other hand, alleviates these
problems by allocating a portion of the award to a higher-valued use
and by discouraging risk-seeking behavior by making the awards less
remunerative.8
A.

JudiciousAllocation of Resources

Promotion of societal norms through deterrence and punishment of
outrageous conduct is the central purpose of punitive damage
awards,' While society receives this benefit regardless of whether it
has a pecuniary stake in the award, allocating a portion of the award to
an organization designed to benefit society as a whole promotes efficiency as opposed to windfall recovery.' Instead of bestowing a windfall recovery on the plaintiff, split-recovery of punitive damage awards
allows society to distribute the award to a higher-valued use.' For example, portions of those punitive damage awards that are collected
could go into a general fund' to benefit society as a whole or a special

78. Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive Damage
Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1903 (1992) [hereinafter Economic Analysis].
79. Id. at 1900 (noting that "in attempting to punish or deter the defendant, punitive damages often endow plaintiffs with windfalls that produce inefficient results").
80. Id. at 1907.
81. See Eighth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1691 (split-recovery upholds the
purpose of punitive damages "while reducing plaintiff windfall from lawsuits and providing funds for the public's benefit").
82. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that the main
goals of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence). See also Gordon v. State,
585 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating, that "the allowance of punitive damages is based entirely upon considerations of public policy"), affd, 608 So.
2d 800 (Fla. 1992), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993). See supra notes 31-38
and accompanying text.
83. See Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021, 1024 (Ala. 1992) (stating that allocation of punitive damages could better serve the purposes behind awarding punitive damages) (quoting Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878,
887 (Ala. 1991)).
84. Grube, supra note 13, at 854.
85. For example, the money could be paid to the general state treasury to relieve

fund" designed to benefit those directly injured by the outrageous conduct of the defendant.87 In either case, the statute puts the money to a
more publicly judicious use than allowing the individual plaintiff to
receive a windfall recovery.' Therefore, the split-recovery allocation of
punitive damages better serves the public by compensating society, as
well as the plaintiff, for the harm committed against it.'

B.

Discouragement of Unnecessary Litigation

While a primary purpose of punitive damages is to encourage plaintiffs to bring suit,' allowing a plaintiff to claim the entire punitive
damage award leads to risk-seeking behavior that "stimulate[s] excessive and unnecessary litigation."9 This threat is especially prevalent in
today's society where punitive damage awards may exceed actual damages by as much as 526 times the actual damages suffered.92 By apportioning a part of the punitive damage recovery to one other than the
plaintiff, split-recovery helps alleviate this problem by making claims
less remunerative and decreasing the plaintiffs incentive to bring
suit. 3 Although these statutes will have a disincentive effect on valid

the tax burden, to a governmental agency designed to regulate misconduct, or to a
private medical agency that could use the funds for research. See Grube, supra note
13, at 854; Smith, 592 So. 2d at 1024 (disbursing a portion of the punitive damages
award to the state's affiliate of the American Heart Association).
86. For example, some commentators suggest distributing the award to a tort
victims' relief fund or a special fund created to compensate other victorious plaintiffs
unable to collect against insolvent defendants. See Grube, supra, note 13, at 854;
Breslo, supra note 15, at 113940. For other possible allocation schemes, see infra
note 252.
87. Smith, 592 So. 2d at 1027 (Shores, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that
allocating a portion of a punitive award to either a general or special fund that advances the cause of justice best serves public policy).
88. Grube, supra note 13, at 854 ("For instance, the State could deposit the money
into its general treasury. The funds could then be used directly to regulate the misconduct for which the punitive damages were assessed, thus more directly deterring
such misconduct . . .).

89. Id. The Iowa split-recovery statute illustrates this principle by allocating a portion of the punitive damage award to a civil reparations fund when the defendant
specifically directs her conduct at society in general as opposed to the plaintiff. See
IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1991)..
90. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
91. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1130 (noting that the potential for high punitive damage recovery leads parties to take risks in pursuing unnecessary litigation).
92. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1993)
(plaintiff awarded $19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages). See generally Nancy G. Dragutsky, Note, Walking the Invisible Line: TXO Pro-

duction Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct 2711 (1993), 21 PEPP. L. REV.
909 (1994) (analyzing the Court's decision in upholding the punitive damage award).
93. Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that

Split-Recovery
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claims as well as frivolous ones, some incentive remains for the plaintiff because the state only appropriates a portion of the plaintiffs punitive damage recovery.' Even at the expense of a few valid claims,
however, the overall disincentive effect of a split-recovery statute may
still benefit society.' Therefore, these split-recovery statutes serve a
valid public policy purpose because, in addition to allocating resources
to more publicly efficient uses, they decrease the potential for frivolous
litigation resulting from punitive damage awards.

IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SPLIT-RECOVERY

Although allocating a portion of punitive damage recoveries to one
other than the plaintiff better serves the interests of justice,' these
statutes raise several potential constitutional problems. " These potential constitutional challenges stem from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,' the substantive' and procedural Due Process Clauses
M
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,'"
the Equal Protection

one of the purposes of split-recovery is discouragement of "punitive damage claims
by making them less remunerative"), affd, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993); Amelia J. Toy, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the
Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY LJ. 303, 329 n.88 (1991).
94. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
95. Some scholars and jurists suggest that the potential for needless and unnecessary litigation negates the societal benefit of bringing these defendants to justice. See
Breslo, supra note 15, at 1153 n.96 (arguing that an increase in inadvisable lawsuits
may be too high a price to pay to prosecute those defendants who would not be
brought to justice without the incentive of punitive damages) (quoting Morris, supra
note 47, at 1183); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(stating that the encouragement of needless litigation perpetuated by allocating the
punitive damage windfall to the plaintiff outweighs the deterrent effects of punitive
damages).
96. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
97. While punitive damage awards alone raise several constitutional concerns, see
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (discussing
the constitutionality of punitive damages), this Comment will not specifically address
these issues.
98. See infra notes 104-140 and accompanying text. While the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause does not explicitly apply to state action, the Fourteenth Amendment
makes it applicable to the states through the doctrine of incorporation. Grube, supra
note 13, at 867.
99. See infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.

Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment"0 ' the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 2 and the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.'"
A.

Takings Clause

The Fifth Amendment prohibits the governmental taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.'" As early as 1898,
the Supreme Court announced guidelines for determining whether state
action hindering a party's right to a judgment passes constitutional
scrutiny."5 To violate the party's constitutional rights, the Court held
that the state action must "take away rights which have been once
vested by a judgment.""° Under this premise, once a plaintiff in a civil
suit secures a vested property right in a damage award, state action to
diminish the award may constitute an unconstitutional taking.0 7 However, the same state action may not constitute a taking where the plaintiff never obtains a right to the specific damage award.1 The ultimate
determination of constitutionality thus hinges on whether the private

101. See infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 182-213 and accompanying text. While the Fifth Amendment
Double Jeopardy Clause does not explicitly apply to state action, the Fourteenth
Amendment makes it applicable to the states through the doctrine of incorporation.
Grube, supra note 13, at 867.
103. See infra notes 214-245 and accompanying text. Application of the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause to state action through the doctrine of incorporation has drawn less acceptance from the judiciary than other Fifth Amendment clauses. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 860-61. In fact, at least one state has declined to make
the Excessive Fines Clause applicable to state action. See People v. Elliot, 112 N.E.
300, 303 (Il1. 1916). However, Justice O'Connor's strong endorsement for its application in her dissent in Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 284 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), suggests that the Supreme Court would
likely conclude that the Excessive Fines Clause does apply to state action through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 860-61.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
105. McCollough v. Virgin, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898) (noting that a taking of rights
that have been vested by a judgment exceeds the power of a legislature).
106. Id. at 123.
107. Lawrence King, Enforcement of Iloida's Punitive Damage Sharing Statute-Is
It Cohstitutional?, FIA. BAR J., Nov. 1991 AT 63 (citing Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412
(Fla. 1950)). However, state appropriation of a vested right may still not be a taking
if the appropriation is "reasonably related to the costs of using the courts." Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980).
108. Eighth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1694 ("If the plaintiff never has a right
to the state's share of the punitive damages, the statute cannot be a taking of the
plaintiffs property.").
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party has a vested property right in the judgment being subject to state
action. "0
To make this determination, a court must first distinguish the type of
judgment sought. A party suffering legally recognizable injury generally
receives an automatic right to bring suit for compensatory damages.' °
Because this right attaches immediately after the party suffers the injury, the party's interest vests prior to entry of judgment.'" Therefore,
any state action that appropriates a portion of the compensatory award
would constitute a taking. 2
While this characterization exists for compensatory damages, most
courts do not extend similar rights to the recovery of punitive damages
until the trier of fact renders judgment."3 Because a party has no immediately vested right to punitive damage recovery, most courts conclude that the party's ability to sue for punitive damages does not con-

109. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 849.
110. Id. While this "right" to redress exists at common law in most states, many
states specifically guarantee this right in their state constitutions. Id. Some courts refuse to even recognize this right, however, and instead claim that a plaintiff has no
vested rights in any measure of damages. See, e.g., Shepherd Components, Inc. v.
Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991).
111. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 851.
112.. Id.
113. Id. at 850 (stating that contrary to "the right to compensatory damages, a person generally does not have a right to punitive damages"). See Gordon v. State, 608
So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 1992) (stating that the right to punitive damages is not property because it is based entirely on public policy and is subject to changes by the
legislature), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993); Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
592 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Ala. 1992); Seaward Constr. Co. v. Bradley, 817 P.2d 971, 975
(Colo. 1991); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473
N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1950) (holding
that the plaintiff has no vested right to a punitive damage award until awarded by
the trier of fact); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973) (noting that no state
grants punitive damages as a right).

fer on him any property rights in a potential judgment."4 As such,
state action that appropriates a portion of a potential punitive award
5
does not necessitate a Takings Clause analysis.1
The rationale behind the different characterization of punitive and
compensatory damages emanates from two distinctive differences between the available remedies. First, unlike the right to compensatory
damages guaranteed by common law or state constitutions,"" the allowance of punitive damages is subject to the discretion of state legislatures."' This discretion gives the states authority to condition or even
abolish punitive damages."' Because of this conditional nature, the
plaintiff has no vested right to the punitive damage award until secured
by a judgment."' Second, unlike a compensatory damage claim which

114. Ross, 48 So. 2d at 414 (holding that "[t]he right to have punitive damages assessed is not property"); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801-02 (following the decision in
Ross); Osborn v. Leach, 47 S.E. 811, 813 (N.C. 1904). But see Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 266-67 (Colo. 1991) (holding that a punitive damage award is a
private property right). While only a few decisions specifically analyze the property
issue, this deficiency stems not from ambivalence but from the broad acceptance of
the principle that a plaintiff receives no vested rights in the assessment of punitive
damages. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 857 n.47.

115. Grube, supra note 13, at 873-74 (noting that under accepted legal theory "[ijf
the plaintiff has no vested property right in potential punitive damages, then the State
does not 'take' the plaintiffs property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment when it
requires that one third of these damages be paid to the state").
116. See supra note 110 (noting that common law guaranteed the right to redress
for compensatory damages).
117. Gordon 608 So. 2d at 801 (stating that any punitive damage award is subject
to the plenary authority of the legislature); Shepherd Components, 473 N.W.2d at 612
(noting that punitive damages "are not allowed as a matter or right and are discre-

tionary"). But see Burrows, supra note 6, at 454 (maintaining that the legislature has
only limited discretion because punitive damages are derived from common law as
well as statutory pronouncement).
118. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 39 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that courts and state legislatures are given the power to restrict and
even abolish the practice of awarding punitive damages); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801
(stating that state legislatures have the power to condition or abolish punitive damages as public policy dictates). In fact, the legislatures in five states completely bar
punitive damage recovery. Harold Lee Schwab, The State of Punitive Damages: Constitutional Law, Pretrial Strategy and Trial Techniques, 41 FED'N INS. & CORP.
COUNS. Q. 57, 63 (1990) (the five states that do not allow punitive damage recovery
are Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington).

119. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801 (stating that the plaintiff has no vested right to
recovery of punitive damages because the award is strictly subject to the authority of
the legislature). See also Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 274 (Colo.
1991) (Rovira, J. dissenting) (stating that because a punitive damage claim is conditioned by the legislature, the entire judgment does not immediately vest in the
plaintiff). But see Burrows, supra note 6, at 456 (suggesting that this conclusion is
faulty because it confuses the right of the legislature to condition a punitive award
with the plaintiffs right to collect the full amount awarded by the jury); Kirk, 818
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courts can independently award, courts can only award punitive damages in conjunction with a successful claim for compensatory damages.'2° Thus, a plaintiff is unable to secure an immediate property right
in the punitive damage award until it becomes viable at entry of judgment.'2'
Two state supreme courts illustrate this interpretation of the Takings
Clause. The Florida Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment challenge to the state's split-recovery allocation system of punitive damages
was not valid in Gordon v. State.'" Because the recovery of punitive
damages was subject to the discretion of the legislature, the court
found that the plaintiff never obtained a property right in the punitive
damage claim.' Likewise, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Associates, Inc.,"' held
that Iowa's split-recovery allocation system did not violate the plaintiffs
Fifth Amendment rights because the discretionary nature of punitive
damages vested no immediate rights in the plaintiff before entry of a
judgment.'25
Contrary to these rulings, in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 2" the
Colorado Supreme Court applied an alternate analysis in holding that
Colorado's punitive damage allocation system violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 2 ' While the court based its decision on a broader interpretation of the property interests of a civil plaintiff,'2 8 the de-

P.2d at 272 (noting that the mere fact that the existence of punitive damages is subject to the discretion of the legislature does not guarantee the statute's constitutionality).
120. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 851.
121. Id.
122. 608 So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993).
123.. Id.
124. 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
125. Id. at 619.
126 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
127. Id. at 273. Justice Shaw, the lone dissenting judge in Gordon also proposed
this alternate analysis. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802 (Shaw, J., concurring and dissenting).
128. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267. The court tried to broaden the typical definition of
property to include a "multiplicity of interests" including "everything that is the subject of ownership, whether tangible or intangible, as well as those rights and interests
which have value to the owner." Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed.
1979)). The court based its definition on a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court
takings cases. See Burrows, supro note 6, at 461-62 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)).

termining factor was a provision in the Colorado statute disavowing any
state interest in the punitive damage award prior to the payment becoming due." Interpreting the provision as an indication of the
legislature's intent to treat a claim for punitive damages as a vested
right, the court concluded that the plaintiffs right to the award superseded the state's interest.' Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions
in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith... and United States
v. Sperry Corp.,"'2 the court then concluded that the state appropriation of the vested property constituted a taking because it did not' "bear
a reasonable relationship to the governmental services provided." al
Because of the disparity in Takings Clause decisions among the
states," only the Supreme Court can ultimately resolve the question
of constitutionality."' However, if current commentary and accepted
legal theory accurately project the modern trend, the Florida and Iowa
decisions appear to be correct." While some commentators limit their
acceptance of a statute's constitutionality according to the statute's language, 37 others argue that split-recovery statutes are constitutional reInstead of focusing on whether the plaintiff had a vested right to the appropriated
property, the court in Kirk focussed on whether "fairness and justice" necessitate
that the state appropriation be compensated. Burrows, supra note 6, at 461.
129. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1990) ("Nothing in
this subsection (4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the
claim for exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment
becoming due.").
130. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267 (stating that "the statutory disavowal .

.

. of any state

interest in a claim for exemplary damages 'at any time prior to payment becoming
due' is an implicit legislative acknowledgement of the property interest created in the
judgment creditor by virtue of the judgment itselr).
131. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). In Webb's, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a state
may deprive a private party of his property if necessary to promote general welfare.
Id. at 163. However, the state's appropriation of interest on a court mandated deposit
fund violated the Takings Clause because the state action bore no reasonable relation
to "the costs of using the courts." Id.
132. 493 U.S. 52 (1989). In Sperry, the Supreme Court used a similar analysis to
that used in Webb's to find that a 1.5% state deduction from an arbitration award for
administrative expenses was reasonable and not violative of the Takings Clause. Id.
at 62.
133. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 270 (stating that the state appropriation was not reasonable
because the percentage prevented the statute from qualifying as a valid tax).
134. Compare Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (split-recovery held constitutional on Takings grounds), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993) and Shepherd
Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991)
(constitutional) with Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (unconstitutional).
135. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari on these constitutional questions
in Gordon, Gordon v. Florida, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993), increased litigation on the matter will likely continue until the Supreme Court definitively rules on the issue.
136. See Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 800; Shepherd Components, 473 N.W.2d at 612.
137. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 855 ("Any interpretation that gives the plaintiff a
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gardless of their statutory provisions." Either way, the vast majority
of commentators agree that without a provision granting them special

rights, plaintiffs do not secure vested property rights in punitive damage

claims."

Therefore, under most split-recovery statutes, state appropri-

ation of a portion of a punitive damage award does not violate the Tak-

ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. °
B.

Substantive Due Process

Besides prohibiting government takings of protectable private property, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution also prohibits the government from depriving a person of private property without affording due
process of law.' This right to due process consists of both procedurproperty interest in the entire award before the government takes its share will likely
doom state allocation on Takings Clause grounds.").
138. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 273 (Rovira, J., dissenting). The dissent in Kirk argued that
even the Colorado statute survived Takings Clause challenges because the plaintiff
only pecured a constitutionally protectable property interest in the share of the punitive damages award the statute allocated to him. Id. at 275 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
The dissent reasoned that because a claim for punitive damages is a statutory right
subject to the discretion of the legislature, the plaintiff took the punitive award subject to the statutory conditions imposed by the legislature. Consequently, the entire
judgment never vested with the plaintiff. Id. at 273-75 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
139. Grube, supra note 13, at 873 ("The overwhelming majority of commentators
have agreed ...
that plaintiffs do not have a right to punitive damages and that
punitive damages are awarded at the discretion of trier of fact."). See also American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 676 (Cal. 1984) ("It is well
established that a plaintiff has no vested property right in a particular measure of
damages, and that the Legislature possesses broad authority to modify the scope and
nature of such damages."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS, § 2, at 14 (5th ed. 1984) ("It is generally agreed that punitive damages are
a windfall to the plaintiff and not a matter of right, and that it is always within the
discretion of the jury or trial judge to withhold them."); Long, supra note 10, at 882
("The plaintiff, as the incidental recipient, generally has no right to punitive damages
but rather receives them only if and as they are awarded by the jury (or by the
court in the absence of a jury)."); Shores, supra note 14, at 90 ("Courts have uniformly held that the plaintiff has no personal right to punitive damages."); Malcolm E.
Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69
VA. L. REV. 269, 292 (1983) ("As courts have uniformly held, no plaintiff has a right
to punitive damages . . . ."). But see Burrows, supra note 6, at 454 ("[Ais long as
punitive damages are allowed by the common law of a state, a constitutionally protected property right attaches to the jury's reasonable determination of punitive damages so that the state may not confiscate from the plaintiff a piece of the award for
itself.").
140. Grube, supra note 13, at 873-74.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits the govern-

al and substantive components."' To find a violation of due process, a
court must first conclude that the disputed state regulation infringes
upon a protectable interest.'" Upon such a finding, substantive due
process then requires that the disputed statute be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.'44 Therefore, a split-recovery statute
will not violate substantive due process unless a court finds both a
protectable property interest in a punitive damage claim and no rational
relationship between the statute and a legitimate governmental objec45
tive. 1

Because courts generally hold that a plaintiff secures no vested property right in a punitive damage claim,"46 most split-recovery statutes
fail this initial criterion and, thus, do not violate due process. "' Even

upon a finding of a protectable property interest,'48 a split-recovery
statute will not violate substantive due process if the legislation "bears
a rational relation to legitimate legislative objectives." 4 ' Of the two

ment from depriving a person of private property without due process of law. U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV.
142. J. Michael McGuinness & Lisa A. McGuinness Parlagreco, The Reemergence of
Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof, and Damages, 24
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1129, 1132-33 (1990). For procedural due process analysis, see
infr-a notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. V (the Constitution limits its protection to life, liberty, or
property).
144. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (holding that laws that bear "a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose," satisfy substantive due process).
145. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 84748 n.27.
146. See supra note 139 (demonstrating that the overwhelming majority of courts
and commentators agree that a plaintiff does not secure a protectable property right
in a potential punitive damage claim).
147. Courts that found no protectable property interest in punitive damages have
not expressly differentiated between Due Process claims and Takings claims because
each claim lacks the required property interest. Id. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 608 So.
2d 800 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993); Shepherd Components, Inc. v.
Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
148. While most courts uniformly maintain that a plaintiff secures no vested personal right to a punitive damage claim, at least two courts have found an inherent property right in such a claim. See, e.g., Shores, supra note 14, at 90 ("Courts have uniformly held that the plaintiff has no personal right to punitive damages."). McBride v.
General Motors Co., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (implying that Georgia
common law guarantees a protectable property right in a punitive damage claim);
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 267 (Colo. 1991) (noting that Colorado's
split-recovery statute implicitly recognizes the property interest inherent in a punitive
damage claim).
For further analysis on whether a protectable property right vests in a claim for
punitive damages, see supra notes 10940 and accompanying text.
149. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent in Gordon outlines an approach for courts to take in making this determination. Id. at 803 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To deter-
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states that have expressly ruled on the underlying purpose of a splitrecovery statute, each reached a different conclusion about its respective statute's legitimacy."5
In McBride v. General Motors Corp., a district court in Georgia found
that the state's split-recovery statute was not rationally related to a
legitimate purpose.' The court reasoned that the promotion of the
economic viability of Georgia businesses was the true objective of the
Georgia split-recovery statute.1 2 The court based its reasoning on the
fact that Georgia split-recovery statute applied only to product liability

awards." Based on this finding, the court concluded that this objective was not a legitimate state interest and, thus, the statute violated
the Due Process Clause."
In Gordon v. State, however, the Florida Supreme Court found that
Florida's split-recovery statute did bear a rational relation to a legiti-

mate governmental objective.'" The Gordon court reasoned that the

mine whether an encroachment by the state passes constitutional scrutiny, courts
should consider.
the propriety of the state's purpose; the nature of the party being subjected
to state action; the substance of the individual's right being infringed upon;
the nexus between the means chosen by the state and the goal it intended
to achieve; whether less restrictive alternatives were available; and whether
individuals are ultimately being treated in a fundamentally unfair manner in
derogation of their substantive rights.
Id. (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. See, e.g., McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1579 (finding the statute unconstitutional on
due process grounds); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802 (upholding the statute as constitutional).
151. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1579 (finding that the statute bore "no legitimate purpose").
152. Id. at 1570 ("This provision is a thinly disguised arbitrary restraint in favor of
business seeking to deter punitive damage actions against egregious business practices
by reducing incentives for injured plaintiffs to take action to punish and deter such
practices.").
153. Id. at 1567. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (Michie 1993). By restricting
the awards to certain classes of torts, the legislature made the statute incompatible
with any potential legitimate objectives such as revenue raising or reduction of
plaintiffs incentive. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1570. Therefore, the legislature's arbitrary classification of when to apply the statute led directly to the court's finding that
the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 1567.
154. Id. at 1577, 1579 ("Nor is the State's purpose, as expressed, legitimate."). In
addition to violating the Due Process Clause, the court also held that the statute violated the Excessive Fines and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution. Id. at
1579.
155. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647

Florida statute served dual legislative objectives: to raise money for the
state treasury and to reduce the incentive for plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring punitive damage claims."* Because the court accepted
the legitimacy of these objectives, it held that the Florida split-recovery
statute was constitutional.'57 Applying the reasoning of Gordon and
McBride, a statute demonstrating the type of objectives advanced in
Gordon, without the arbitrary classification enunciated in McBride,
satisfies substantive due process." Regardless of this determination,
however, most split-recovery statutes do not implicate the Due Process
clause because a plaintiff typically holds no protectable property right
in a potential punitive damage award.'59
C. ProceduralDue Process
The guarantees of procedural due process require courts to grant
parties notice and the opportunity to be heard."'6 Like substantive due
process, procedural due process flows from the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.' Similar to a substantive due process analysis, parties must establish a protectable property
right before the guarantees of procedural due process apply."n
Assuming, arguendo, that a court has found such a protectable property interest in a punitive damage claim,'" the next question is whether the state action implicates the Due Process Clause. The Supreme
Court answered this question in the negative in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip."' In Haslip, the Court held that the common
law method of assessing punitive damages did not violate due process. 6' The Court maintained that the "issue of whether the plaintiff
receives the punitive damage award is irrelevant because the defendant
could get the same process whether the money goes to the plaintiff or
to the State."'' Therefore, regardless of the state's appropriation, split-

(1993).

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 84748 n.27.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
160. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1972).
161. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law"). See supra text accompanying note 145.
163. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
164. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
165. Id. at 17 ("[E]very state and federal court that has considered the question has
ruled that the common-law method for assessing punitive damages does not in itself
violate due process.").
166. Grube, supra note 13, at 874.
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recovery statutes do not implicate procedural due process guarantees in
cases between private parties. 67
D.

Equal Protection

While each of the preceding constitutional challenges depends on a
finding of a protectable property interest," a successful equal protection challenge does not require such a determination." Generally, the
constitutional guarantee of "equal protection of the laws"7 ' means that
no state may treat similarly situated persons differently under the
law. 7' However, unless the class being discriminated against is a suspect class,"2 a state can satisfy equal protection questions by merely
showing that the discriminatory classification bears a rational relation
to a legitimate state interest." Thus, a split-recovery statute may raise

167. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 84748 n.27 ("State allocation may survive in any
event since the Supreme Court has determined that existing common-law methods
generally provide enough protection in cases solely between private parties.").
168. See supra notes 106, 145, and 162 and accompanying text.
169. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
171.. Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 732-33 (D.C. Md. 1977).
172. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Courts
employ a strict scrutiny standard in determining the legitimacy of classifications when
they involve members of a "suspect" class. Id. The classes typically considered suspect are those which society has traditionally subjected to "a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Examples of suspect classifications include race, national origin, and alienage. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. at 313 n.4.
Even if a state classification does not involve the rights of a suspect class, a
plaintiff can still secure strict scrutiny analysis by proving that the state action "interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right." Id. at 312. Although plaintiffs may
argue that split-recovery statutes deny them the fundamental right to punitive damage
recovery, the wide latitude states have to condition or even abolish punitive damages
suggests that this argument would likely fail. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90. See
supra note 118 (states given discretion to condition or abolish punitive damages); 2
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 14.7 (2d ed. 1992) (summarizing equal protection analysis).
Absent a finding of a suspect class, courts also impose heightened scrutiny for
discriminatory classifications involving gender and illegitimacy. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456, 461 (1988) (noting that intermediate scrutiny applies to all "classifications based
on sex or illegitimacy"). However, most split recovery statutes do not implicate such
scrutiny because they do not typically differentiate based on either gender or illegitimacy.
173. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 172,

equal protection questions if the statute differentiates between the
types of cases and plaintiffs subject to the state allocation. 4
Upon determining that a split-recovery statute applies to only certain
classes, the court must apply the "rational basis test" to ascertain the
legitimacy of the state's interest.75 In American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Community Hospital, Inc.,6 the California Supreme Court held that
because reducing medical malpractice insurance costs was a legitimate
objective and that the statute in question bore a rational relation to that
objective, the state's statute, which only applied
to malpractice cases,
77
did not violate equal protection principles.
Contrary to such holdings, in McBride v. General Motors Corp.,"
the district court in Georgia found that Georgia's split-recovery statute
failed to rationally further the state's alleged revenue raising purpose
because "the differentiation [bore] no real relationship to the object or
purposes of the legislation." While the district court in McBride refused to accept the state's purported revenue related purpose, most
courts give broad deference to the state legislature's judgment."
Therefore, the decision in McBride may have limited application to other state's split-recovery statutes.' Under either analysis, however, a
split-recovery statute that applies only to certain classes will not violate
the Equal Protection Clause if the statute discriminates for a rational
and legitimate purpose.

§ 14.7 (summarizing equal protection analysis).
174. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90. See IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1987) (making the
split-recovery statute applicable only when the plaintiff was not the intended recipient
of the defendant's conduct); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie 1987) (only applicable in products liability cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (Supp. 1993) (only applicable in medical malpractice cases).
175. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90.
176. 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984).
177. Id. at 679. Although the statute in question concerned periodic payment provisions rather than state appropriation, the reasoning in the case is analogous to the
treatment of split-recovery of punitive damages. Id. at 678.
178. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
179. Id. at 1570. The statute bore no rational relationship because it arbitrarily discriminated between products liability plaintiffs who could retain only 25% of any punitive damages awarded and plaintiffs in other areas who could retain 10096 of any
punitive damages awarded. Id.
180. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90 ("Traditionally, under the rational basis test
of a state's interest, courts have given almost unlimited deference to the judgment of
the state legislature."). See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 314 (1976).
181. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90.
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E. Double Jeopardy
While the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution expressly applies to government appropriation of vested property through
the Takings and Due Process clauses, the amendment also provides
private parties protection against double jeopardy.'" The Double Jeopardy Clause maintains that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.""8 The Supreme
Court has consistently held that this clause provides protection against
the peril of multiple punishment and against multiple prosecution for
the same offense.1" However, the Court limits the clause's applicability to punishment or prosecution that is "essentially criminal."'
In determining whether a subsequent action is essentially criminal,
the specific label given a type of proceeding is not determinative.
Instead, a court must evaluate the purpose of the proceedings to deter-

mine whether it is criminal in nature. 87 If the purpose of the subse-

182. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
183. Id.

184. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989). Split-recovery statutes may
implicate either of these prohibitions in several ways.- Kirgis, supra note 15, at 86465. If the state brings a criminal action against a defendant, it may implicate the prohibition against multiple prosecutions for the same offense by retrying the case civilly. Halper, 490 U.S. at 444 (noting that in an analogous Supreme Court case, the defendants unsuccessfully argued that due to the double jeopardy prohibition against
multiple prosecution, a prior criminal case forbid a later civil case). Even if the state
dispenses with this prohibition, a civil suit that follows a successful criminal suit and
that imposes a fine may still implicate double jeopardy by violating the proscription
against multiple punishment. Id.
185. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 398 (1938) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause "prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.
The question for decision is thus whether (the statute in question) imposes a criminal
sanction").
While the Court prohibits multiple criminal punishment for the same offense, the
Court has held that the government can bring dual criminal and civil actions for a
single offense without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States ex. rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943).
186. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 (stating that the type of proceedings is of little
importance in determining the nature of the action because the "notion of punishment . . . cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law").
187. Id. at 447 n.7 ("[W]e hold merely that in determining whether a particular civil
sanction constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purpose actually served by the
sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the
sanction, that must be evaluated."). The Court used a similar analysis in Breed when

quent proceedings is punitive, rather than remedial, the action implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause because of its criminal nature."
The central idea behind this limitation is that the government should
not be able to use its resources and position to subject a defendant to
repeated and excessive punishment or prosecution.' Therefore, in determining whether split-recovery statutes subject an accused to double
jeopardy, a court must assess the character of the state action. "
While the Supreme Court has yet to apply the above analysis to splitrecovery, several cases using this reasoning suggest that split-recovery
statutes may implicate double jeopardy. In United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess,'' the Court held that punishment in a prior criminal prosecution did not preclude the government from recovering its portion of the
civil damages in a qui tam action.'" Although the case did not discuss
the constitutionality of split-recovery statutes or even punitive damages,
the analysis of recovery in a qui tam action is analogous to modem
split-recovery statutes in that the government receives a portion of the
plaintiffs recovery." The Court maintained that civil actions that allocate an award between the government and a private party implicate
double jeopardy when they are punitive or vindictive rather than remedial. "' While ultimately ruling that double jeopardy was not applicable,
the Court based its decision on the determination that the qui tam proceeding was remedial and did not impose a criminal sanction.' There-

it determined the criminal nature of the proceedings using three factors: the purpose
of the proceedings, the potential consequences, and whether the government brought
the action. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528.
188. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (holding that "a defendant who already has been
punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution").
189. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 866.
190. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 (maintaining that double jeopardy violations "can
be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed- on the
individual by the machinery of the state").
191. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
192. Id. at 549. In a qui tam action, a private party brings suit in the name of the
government for an offense committed against society. United States ex rel. Givler v.
Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72, 72 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
193. While the private party in a qui tam action receives a portion of the recovery
for her effort, the government receives the majority of the recovery. Halper, 490 U.S.
at 444 n.5. The Court noted that in Hess, the qui tam provisions of the statute in
question limited the private party plaintiffs share to a maximum of 25% of the total
award. Id. at 444. Similarly, under a split-recovery statute, the government receives a
portion of any punitive damages awarded to a private plaintiff bringing suit on behalf
of society to punish and deter future tort-feasors. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
194. Hess, 317 U.S. at 548-49.
195. Id. at 549.
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fore, if the underlying purpose of the state action is punitive, as in splitrecovery, the decision in Hess implies that the Court would consider
the state action criminal and subject it to double jeopardy scrutiny."
In United States v. Halper,97 the Supreme Court again implicitly
suggested that split-recovery of punitive damages implicates double
jeopardy. In Halper, the Court held that when the government criminally prosecutes and punishes a defendant, any subsequent civil suit that
does not serve a strictly remedial function violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause." While the Court maintained that this type of suit between
private parties does not implicate double jeopardy, it emphasized that
this same suit, when instigated by the government, infringes upon a
defendant's double jeopardy rights." 9 Although the Court left unresolved the question of whether an action brought by a private party on
behalf of the government was constitutional,' it suggested that this
type of suit, if punitive, would violate double jeopardy." Therefore, if
the government maintains an interest in a punitive damage claim
brought by a private party, as in suits brought under a split-recovery
statute, the state appropriation may violate double jeopardy.'
The Court's noted reluctance to resolve the issue, however, leaves the
question as to whether double jeopardy applies to split-recovery unsettled.' While the Court in Halper held that the Double Jeopardy

196. See id. at 548-49.
197. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
198. Id. at 451 ("IT]he only proscription established by our ruling is that the Government may not criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon
him, and then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and receive a
judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of making the Government
whole.").
199. Id. at 450.
200. Id. at 451 n.11. The Court noted that, like the decision in Hess, it was leaving
the constitutional question of double jeopardy unresolved. Id.
201. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 866. The Court specifically noted that its decision in
Hess assumed that civil litigation instigated by the government and a private party
jointly implicates double jeopardy. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.ll ("In Hess, the Court
assumed but did not decide that a qui tam action could give rise to double jeopardy."). The Court reiterated this assumption in a later case when it noted that the
Double Jeopardy Clause limits the amount the government may recover in a civil
suit, after fully punishing the defendant criminally. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.21 (1989).
202. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 866.
203. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.ll. See Kirgis, supra note 15, at 19. The district
court in Georgia is the only lower court to rule whether split-recovery violates double jeopardy. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).

Clause prevents the government from instigating a subsequent claim for
punitive damages in a civil action, the Court focused on the
government's initiative in bringing the suit.' Unlike the governmental
action in Halper,the government plays no role in instigating a claim for
punitive damages under a split-recovery statute.w Moreover, a claim
for punitive damages under a split-recovery statute differs from a qui
tam action in which the plaintiff sues in the name of the governmentas because the government under a split-recovery statute is not a
named party to the action.' Therefore, a court "may find that the
mere diversion of money to the government does not by itself distinguish that type of action from a private civil action which is immune
from double jeopardy analysis."2"
In the event a court rejects this proposition and holds split-recovery
accountable to double jeopardy protection, the next concern becomes
whether a specific split-recovery allocation violates either the prohibition against multiple punishment or multiple prosecution.2' To make
this determination, courts must individually examine each case to ascertain whether the defendant has been subject to previous criminal prosecution,"' whether the portion of the punitive damage recovered by the

Relying on the Court's decision in Brouning-Ferris, the court in McBride held that
split-recovery transforms the civil nature of punitive damage recovery into an action
implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1578. However, this decision is tenuous at best because the "court had little justification or reason to find that awarding
a portion of the award to the State would alter the civil status of the action." Grube,
supra note 13, at 869. Because the district court in McBride does not adequately
substantiate its holding, the precedential value of the ruling is suspect. Id. See also
Kirgis, supra note 15, at 856 n.90 ("The decision in McBride . . . may have little or
no precedential value").
204. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (limiting its holding to actions where the government
"bring[s] a separate civil action based on the same conduct").
205. No state split-recovery statute awards the government any right to take an
active role in a punitive damage claim until the court renders a judgment. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1989) ("Nothing in this subsection (4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for exemplary damages or
in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment becoming due.").
206. See Kirgis, supra note 15, at 866.
207. Id.
208. Id. Commentators attribute this interpretation to a greater emphasis on the
general theory behind double jeopardy, that the government should not be able to
use resources and position to subject defendants to repeated and excessive prosecution. Id.
209. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
210. See id. (noting that double jeopardy protection only arises upon the "second"
prosecution or upon "multiple" punishments for a single offense). While the Double
Jeopardy Clause may prevent a subsequent criminal prosecution after a civil punitive
recovery, a civil punitive recovery alone does not violate double jeopardy since the
defendant has not been subject to a second prosecution. See Kirgis, supra note 15, at
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state exceeds the full civil penalty allowed by law,"' or whether the
defendant was subject to multiple punitive damage awards." However, before making any such determination, the court must first decide if
split-recovery statutes are criminal in nature so as to give rise to double
jeopardy protection."3
F.

Excessive Fines

The Eighth Amendment prevents the imposition of "excessive fines"
by any state2"4 or the federal government.2"' While many civil fines
are excessive, the Supreme Court has ruled that only those fines imposed in actions that are criminal in nature are subject to a constitutional determination of excessiveness."' The reason for this distinction
arises from the traditional notion of the Excessive Fines Clause as protection against governmental abuse of its power, rather than protection
from civil penalties."7 As in double jeopardy analysis,"8 the specific

867 (noting that a civil punitive recovery must prohibit any subsequent criminal action).
211. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (noting that nothing "precludes the Government from
seeking the full civil penalty against a defendant who previously has not been punished for the same conduct, even if the civil sanction imposed is punitive").
Additionally, if the specific split-recovery statute allocates the state's share of the
award directly to a non-governmental agency, the statute can avoid violating the prohibition against multiple punishment or prosecutions by the government. See infra
notes 300-03 and accompanying text; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(4) (West
Supp. 1993) (awarding a portion of the punitive damages award to the state's Public
Medical Assistance Trust Fund); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c) (1993) (awarding a portion of the punitive damage award to the state's Criminal Injuries Compensation Account).
212. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 867. While the government may not have brought any
criminal action against the defendant, imposing multiple civil penalties on the defendant through multiple punitive damage awards could violate the prohibition against
multiple punishment for the same offense. Id.
213. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 103 (discussing incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause).
215. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
216. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (noting that the traditions of
the Eighth Amendment suggest "an intention to limit the power of those entrusted
with the criminal-law function of government").
217. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989)
("Simply put, the primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power, not concern with the extent or purpose
of civil damages."). See Eighth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1695.
218. See supra note 186.

label given to a type of proceeding is not determinative of the civil or
crininal nature of the action."9 Even in civil actions, courts must focus on whether the sanction imposed is penal and thus criminal in nature. " Because most commentators and jurists agree that the main
purpose of punitive damages is retribution and deterrence, punitive
damage awards, as well as split-recovery statutes, may implicate the
Eighth Amendment."
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the first issue in Browning-FerrisIndustries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.' In Browning-Ferris, the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause "does not constrain
an award of [punitive] damages in a civil suit when the government
neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share
of the damages awarded."' The Court reasoned that because the government had not actively sought to punish, nor had used the public
court system to impose excessive penalties for the purpose of revenue
raising, an award of punitive damages between private citizens passed
constitutional scrutiny.' Although the Court expressly declined to decide whether the Excessive Fines Clause applied to split-recovery of
punitive damages,"5 many commentators and jurists maintain that the
Court implied that any punitive damage award shared by the government implicates the Excessive Fines Clause."
219. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37 ("Some punishments, though not labeled
'criminal' by the State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the
circumstances in which they are administered to justify application of the Eighth
Amendment.").
220. Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 126. Even when the state categorizes an action as a
civil penalty, courts must examine the nature of the proceedings to determine if it is
so "punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [this] intention." United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
221. Eighth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1695-96.
222. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In Browning-Ferris, the defendant, a commercial waste
management company, used unfair price cutting schemes to drive its main competitor,
the plaintiff, out of business. Id. at 260-61. Because this conduct violated the
Sherman Act, the plaintiff sued and won an award of $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages. Id. at 262. The defendant appealed the decision claiming that the punitive damage award violated the Excessive Fines Clause. Id.
223. Id. at 263-64.
224. Id. at 275 ("Here the government of Vermont has not taken a positive step to
punish, as it most obviously does in the criminal context, nor has it used the civil
courts to extract large payments or forfeitures for the purpose of raising revenue or
disabling some individual.").
225. Osen & Boutrous, supra note 5, at 922 (noting that "the Court in BrowningFerris reserved for future review the issue whether punitive damage awards imposed
in civil cases . . . by private parties who share some part of the award with the
government ...
are constrained by the [Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause]"). See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276 n.21 ("We leave [this] question open
for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.").
226. Kirgis, supra note 15, at 857. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 298-99
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Extrapolating from this inference, other commentators suggest that
the penal nature of punitive damages, along with the undeserved state
appropriation, demands that split-recovery undergo the scrutiny of the
Excessive Fines Clause. 7 Professor James Ghiardi, a leading authority
on punitive damages, proposes that split-recovery triggers excessive
fine scrutiny because the statutes serve only to fulfill the state function
of punishment and deterrence.' Therefore, these states are using
their split-recovery statutes to "punish through the civil law conduct
which might otherwise go unpunished under the criminal law." Because Ghiardi concludes that statutes are used to exact punitive measures, he maintains that the state appropriation, if excessive, is unconstitutional.'
While the Supreme Court declined to decide whether split-recovery
implicated the Excessive Fines Clause, two district courts have ruled on
the issue, each resolving it differently." In McBride v. General Motors. Corp.,2 the district qourt in Georgia relied on the Court's inference in Browning-Ferris' in holding that it was unconstitutional for
the state of Georgia "to involve itself in the area of civil damage litigation between private parties... when the state through the legislative
process, preempts for itself a share of the award. " ' The court reasoned that the state extraction of an interest in the punitive damage

(O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that the majority's position suggests
that punitive damages recovered by the government are subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause); Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 126 (stating that Browning-Ferris indicates
that the Court is "leaning toward imposing excessive fines limitations upon state-extracted punitive damage awards").
227. Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 129. See Kirgis, supra note 15, at 859.
228, Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 129 (noting that the current statutes serve no function other than to "allow state governments to reap the benefits of successful punitive damage claims, even though the states have not been damaged in any way").
229. Id. at 121.
230. Id. at 129.
231. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (unconstitutional); Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (constitutional).
232. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
233. Eighth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1694 (noting that the district court relied heavily on the Court's decision in Browning-Ferris to strike down Georgia's
split-recovery statute). Some commentators are critical of McBride's heavy reliance on
the Court's decision in Browning-Ferris.Grube, supra note 13, at 869 ("The McBride
court could have properly argued that its holding was not inconsistent with the
Browning-Ferris dictum, but not that Browning-Ferris stated a legal conclusion substantiating the McBride holding.")(emphasis in original).
234. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1579.

award transformed the civil nature of the action into a fine imposed for
the benefit of the state.' Therefore, the court concluded that the statute implicated the Excessive Fines Clause.'
On the contrary, in Burke v. Deere & Co., the district court in Iowa held that the Iowa split-recovery statute was clearly distinguishable
from the split-recovery statute in McBride and did not implicate the
Excessive Fines Clause.' The court noted that the Iowa split-recovery
statute, unlike the Georgia statute, gave the state no monetary interest
in the punitive damage award.' Referencing the Supreme Court decision in Browning-Ferris,the district court reasoned that "[a] clear distinction can be made between funds that are to be placed into the state
treasury and those funds that are to be placed into a civil reparations
trust fund to be administered by the courts."24 ° Therefore, the
legislature's decision to apportion the state's share of the award to a
non-governmental agency prevented the statute from violating the Excessive Fines Clause."'
Even if a court determines that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to
a state's split-recovery statute, this does not automatically render the
statute unconstitutional.242 The court must examine each apportionment on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the state's share is
excessive.' Ultimately, if a court adopts the inference set down in
Browning-Ferrisand followed by McBride, only a split-recovery statute
allocating an excessive proportion of a punitive damage award to a
state agency renders the statute unconstitutional.
While the ultimate resolution of these unsettled constitutional issues
is left to the Supreme Court, current commentary and accepted legal
theory suggest that most split-recovery statutes do not constitute an unconstitutional taking, violate either party's due process rights, or fail
equal protection scrutiny.244 However, state appropriation of the collected funds may translate the nature of the punitive damage claim into
a criminal action implicating the Double Jeopardy and Equal Protection

235. Id. at 1578.
236. Id. at 1579.
237. 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
23& Id. at 1242.
239 Id. See IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1993).
240, Burke, 780 F. Supp. at 1242.
241, See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
242. Eighth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1696 (noting that even if a statute comes within the scope of the Eighth Amendment, this "should not result in facial invalidity of these provisions").
243. Id. For discussion of possible methods of determining "excessiveness," see
Kirgis, supra note 15, at 861.
244. See supra notes 104-81 and accompanying text.
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clauses of the Constitution." Therefore, unless the split-recovery statute can prevent such a determination, the Supreme Court may find the
statute unconstitutional.

V.

SURVEY OF SPLIT-RECOVERY STATUTES

Based on the potential constitutional infirmities of current split-recovery statutes, many commentators have suggested altering the current
statutes to meet constitutional scrutiny.24" This Comment proposes a
model statute which satisfies all potential constitutional challenges."?
Before making such a proposal, however, the underlying principles
behind each of the split-recovery statutes currently utilized must first
be examined. Rather than separately surveying each state's split-recovery statute, a general examination of the specific provisions of these
statutes allows a better understanding of the underlying principles. The
specific provisions of these statutes are devisable into four categories
that this Comment labels the Identity, Allocation, Timing, and Logistical
provisions.
A.

Identity Provisions

The Identity provisions of a split-recovery statute identify the recipient of the distribution' and the types of cases to which the provisions apply. 9 The first type of Identity provision in a split-recovery
statute designates to whom the legislature awards an interest in the
plaintiffs punitive damage recovery. This interest can take the form of
either a general fund created for society's benefit as a whole or a special fund designed to reduce the harm suffered by those members of
society foreseeably injured by the defendant's action.' Of the ten jurisdictions recognizing split-recovery of punitive damages, five allocate

245. See supra notes 182-243 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 15, at 873; Sloane, supra note 15, at 505; Burrows,
supra note 6, at 467.
247. See infra notes 297-339 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
249. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
250. Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021, 1026-27 (Ala. 1992) (concurring and dissenting) (noting that split-recovery can allocate some portion of a
punitive award to a state's general fund or a special fund 'to reduce the harm for
which the defendant has been found guilty"); Grube, supra note 13, at 854.

the public's share to their state's general revenue fund,"l while the remaining five award the share to a special fund. 2
While the revenue generating purpose behind awarding the punitive
damage share to the state's general fund is obvious, the purposes behind the special fund allocations are more complex. By allocating the
public's share to a special fund, the state legislatures attempt to directly
benefit either those members of the public foreseeably injured by the
defendant's outrageous conduct' or the industry sustaining the punitive damage award.2" Alternatively, some jurisdictions use special
funds to indirectly benefit those same members of society by promoting
justice throughout the judicial system.' Regardless of whether the
purpose of the special fund is direct or indirect, taking a portion of the

251. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (1989); G& CODE ANN. § 51-125.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675.2 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. Civ.
PRac. L. & R. § 8701(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3)
(1992).
252. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (Department of Rehabilitation Services); IOWA CODE § 668A.1.2.b (1991) (civil reparations
trust fund); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992) (health care stabilization fund);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c) (1991) (criminal injuries compensation account). Florida
has both a general and special fund allocation provision depending upon the nature
of the case. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992) (public medical
assistance trust fund in cases of personal injury or wrongful death and to general
fund otherwise).
253. For example, distribution of a portion of a punitive award in a tort case to a
state's department of rehabilitation or to a criminal injuries compensation account or,
in the case of personal injury litigation, distribution to a public medical assistance
trust fund, directly benefits those groups likely to suffer harm from the defendant's
action. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (Department
of Rehabilitation Services); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c) (1991) (criminal injuries
compensation account); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992) (public
medical assistance trust fund).
254. For example, an award to a health care stabilization fund in medical malpractice cases directly benefits the entire health care industry rather than just those injured by the defendant's action. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992)
(health care stabilization fund). While Kansas is the only state to use this type of
special fund to benefit a specific industry, several commentators suggest alternate
ways to use split-recovery statutes to benefit certain constituencies. See, e.g., Ghiardi
& Kircher, supra note 11, at § 21.03 (stating that split-recovery statutes could promote business in products liability cases by awarding money to either an insurance
liability fund or an independent national research organization).
255. For example, the statute can promote justice by allocating the public's share to
a civil reparations fund to foster litigation programs for indigent citizens, or to a
fund for plaintiffs unable to collect judgments against insolvent defendants. See IOWA
CODE § 668A.1.2.b (1991) (civil reparations trust fund); Breslo, supra note 15, at 113940 (maintaining that a fund for plaintiffs unable to collect against insolvent defendants allows full reparation for those citizens deserving of full compensation).
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monetary benefit of the punitive award away from the plaintiff and
allocating it to a public fund benefits society rather than individuals.'
The second Identity provision of a split-recovery statute determines
the types of cases in which a punitive damage recovery will be subject
to split-recovery. Three possible statutory classifications exist: all civil
cases, specific cases, or only cases in which the defendant did not specifically direct his conduct at the plaintiff. The majority of jurisdictions
with split-recovery statutes do not distinguish between the types of civil
cases that give rise to a split-recovery allocation. 7 In some states,
however, legislatures have attempted to avoid such an arbitrary application by tailoring their split-recovery statutes to benefit a certain industry believed to necessitate special treatment.' For example, the Kansas legislature has limited the application of its split-recovery statute to
medical malpractice cases in an attempt to reduce rising insurance
costs caused by unfettered punitive damage allocations.' Another attempt to avoid such an arbitrary application, utilized by one state, Iowa,
limits the use of its split-recovery statute to cases in which the defendant did not specifically direct his conduct at the plaintiff.'
B.

Allocation Provisions

The Allocation provisions of split-recovery statutes determine the
proportion of the punitive damage award to be extracted and when to
deduct attorney's fees from this allocation. To maintain the proper level

256. Grube, supra note 13, at 854 ("[Slociety could put punitive damage awards to
better use than allowing individual civil plaintiffs windfall recoveries."). See supra
notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (1989) (in all civil actions); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 76.73(1)(a) (West Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, par. 2-1207
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675.2 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. § 8701(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1) (1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992). Although the state of Utah allows for split-recovery in all
civil suits, it does impose a $20,000 minimum on the punitive damage award for the
statute to apply. Id. (percentage of the punitive damage award "in excess of

$20,000").
258. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992) (tort cases arising from product liability claims); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992) (medical

malpractice cases).
259. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 678 (Cal.
1984) (stating that the Kansas legislature attempted to reduce insurance costs in medical malpractice cases by enacting their split-recovery statute).
260. See IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1991).

of incentive for plaintiffs to bring punitive damage claims,2l a state
legislature's determination of the proper proportion of extraction that
can be imposed on a punitive damage award may take into consideration several different factors, including the costs of litigation,' the
effort undertaken by the plaintiff,21 and the maintenance of the proper
incentive to bring suit.2 In weighing these factors, the proportion
deemed adequate by state legislatures ranges from twenty percent to
seventy-five percent of a punitive damage award.2" Alternatively, some
jurisdictions do not set an arbitrary percentage, but give the trial court
discretion to determine the reasonable proportion depending on the
facts of a given case.'
The timing of the attorney fee deduction appears to be a primary
reason for disparities among extraction percentages. Some states deduct attorney's fees from the original punitive damage award before the

split-recovery allocation.

7

Because this deduction eliminates a major

factor in determining an adequate proportion,' it substantially reduces the need for a low extraction percentage. Therefore, an extraction
percentage in these states will take a higher portion from the plaintiff's
punitive damage recovery. Other states do not deduct fees from the
original punitive damage award and thus an adequate extraction proportion need not be as high.' Therefore, the timing of attorney fee de261. See supra notes 3947 and accompanying text.

262. Grube, supra note 13, at 861 (costs and expenses were a factor in determining
what percentage would be adequate as early as the first formal proposal made by the
American Bar Association regarding split-recovery).
263. Id. (determining what is a reasonable proportion to award the plaintiff by examining how much compensation he should receive for his effort).
264. Breslo, supra note 15, at 1135 (to determine proper allocation, use the proportion necessary to give the plaintiff the proper incentive to bring valid punitive damage claims).
265. See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (1989) (33.396 extracted from
plaintiffs award); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1992) (35%); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992) (75%); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp.
1992) (50%); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675.2 (Supp. 1992) (50%); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R.
§ 8701(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (20%); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c) (1991) (50%);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (50%).
266. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) ("The
trial court may also in its discretion, apportion the punitive damage award . . .).

Instead of giving the trial court unfettered discretion, some jurisdictions have set a
cap on the potential percentage allotted to the plaintiff and give the court the discre-

tion to award any amount up to the percentage cap. See IOWA CODE § 668A.1.2.b
(1991) (the court can award the plaintiff "an amount not to exceed twenty-five percent of the punitive or exemplary damages awarded").
267. See IOWA CODE § 668A.1.2.b (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(a) (1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675.2 (Supp. 1992) (percentage
allocated after "the deduction of attorneys' fees and expenses").
268. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
269. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (1989) (no prior deduction of

Split-Recovery

[Vol. 21: 857, 1994]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

ductions will likely have little effect on the plaintiffs ultimate recovery
because the proportion extracted by these split-recovery statutes typically reflects an adjustment for the deduction of attorney's fees.'
While the timing of the deduction may have a negligible impact on
the plaintiffs ultimate recovery, it may substantially reduce the recovery of an attorney working for a contingency fee. A main purpose of
making claims less remunerative under a split-recovery statute is to
decrease the number of frivolous claims by reducing the plaintiffs-and
the attorney's--incentive to sue." However, an allocation provision
that awards the plaintiffs attorney a share of the punitive recovery
before making the split-recovery extraction does not reduce the
attorney's recovery.' To counter this effect, of the four states that
make this initial deduction, at least one provides that the basis of the
contingency fee is the plaintiffs punitive recovery rather than the over-

all punitive recovery.'
attorney's fees and one-third extracted from plaintiffs punitive award); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1992) (no prior deduction and 3596 extracted); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992) (no prior deduction and 5096 extracted); N.Y.
(no prior deduction and 2096 extracted) with GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie
Supp. 1992) (attorney's fees deducted from state's share and 7596 deducted).
270. Regardless of when the statute deducts the fund's share of the punitive damage award, the statute can achieve the same level of appropriation by altering the
percentage deducted.
For example, if the statute appropriates 5096 of a $100,000 punitive damage
award and then mandates the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees ($20,000) out of his own
share ($50,000), the plaintiff will end up with a $30,000 windfall (share - cost) as
incentive for bringing the claim to justice and the designated fund will end up with
$50,000.
We can also reach the same result by taking out the plaintiffs proportion first,
and increasing the fund's share in the award to 62.5%. In this case, the statute would
first deduct the attorney's fees ($20,000) from the punitive damage award ($100,000)
and then appropriate 62.5% of the difference for the designated fund. This division
would again give the plaintiff a $30,000 windfall (37.5% of $80,000) and the designated fund a $50,000 share (62.5% of $80,000).
271. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
272. For example, if an attorney takes a case for a one-third contingency fee and
brings suit against the defendant for $300,000 ($100,000 compensatory and $200,000
punitive damages), under a 5096 split-recovery statute, the attorney would recover the

following:
If attorney's fees are deducted before the split:
$300,000 X 33.396 = $100,000
If attorney's fees are deducted after the split:
($100,000 X 33.3%) + ($200,000 X 50% X 33.3%) = $66,667
273.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 768.73(7) (West Supp. 1992) ("Claimant's attorney's fees, if

Another problem with the Allocation provisions that may diminish
the function of these split-recovery statutes arises in the case of insolvent defendants. It is obviously not the intent of split-recovery statutes
to hinder the effectiveness of compensatory damages. However, a state
that extracts a portion of an award before complete recovery of compensatory damages potentially decreases the overall compensation to
the plaintiff if the defendant cannot satisfy the entire judgment.274 To
alleviate this potential problem, at least one state has imposed a statutory limitation on the public's share of a split-recovery extraction.27"
Under the New York statute, the state may not collect any portion of its
share until payment of all compensatory damages, costs, and attorney's
fees.276 Therefore, the defendant's insolvency will not affect the
plaintiffs decision whether to add a punitive damage claim to her claim
for compensatory damages.
C.

Timing Provisions

The Timing provisions within a split-recovery statute serve to determine when the state's interest in the punitive damage claim arises.
While some jurisdictions fail to explicitly address this issue,77 others
realize the importance of these provisions in controlling settlement
negotiations27 and deterring constitutional challenges.' Most schol-

payable from the judgment, are, to the extent that they are based on the punitive
damages, calculated based only on the portion of the judgment payable to the claimant . .

").

274. For example, a plaintiff wins a judgment for $500,000 ($100,000 compensatory
and $400,000 punitive damages) in a jurisdiction with a split-recovery extraction of
75% to the state. The defendant's total assets amount to $150,000, which is allotted
proportionally between the punitive and compensatory damages claims: $30,000 11/5 of
$150,000] to compensatory damages and $120,000 [4/5 of $150,000] to punitive damages. Under the split-recovery extraction statute, the plaintiff will only receive $60,000
($30,000 from compensatory damages + $30,000 from punitive damages [25% of
$120,000]) and thus will not be fully compensated for compensatory damages that
would have been fully reimbursed without the punitive damage award.
275. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & R. § 8703 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
276. Id. It is imperative to note that this rule applies to attorney's fees as well as
compensatory damages. While one might expect the application of this rule in cases
in which the deduction for attorney's fees occurs before the splitting of the award,
New York applies this rule even though the payment of attorney's fees occurs solely
out of the plaintiffs share after the splitting of the award. See id.
277. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 668A.1.2.b
(1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); and UTAH CODE

ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992).
278. Several states at least implicitly recognize the problems associated with settlement under a split-recovery statute. See FILASTAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West Supp.
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1992); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 8701(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993); and OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(l)(c) (1991). The pro-
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ars recognize that by apportioning a percentage of punitive damage
awards to the state, parties in litigation have an increased incentive to
settle because awards recovered in settlement are not subject to splitrecovery.'m While the overcrowded judicial system typically welcomes
settlement of civil litigation as socially beneficial,"' settlement undertaken to avoid the imposition of a split-recovery statute often leads to
inefficient and socially detrimental results.'
To avert this potential for unwanted settlement, some jurisdictions
enacted provisions under their split-recovery statutes to limit the
plaintiffs ability to settle. Although no jurisdiction has gone so far as to
make settlements illegal in punitive damage claims,' some jurisdictions give the state an interest in the litigation as soon as the trial court
renders its initial decision.' On the other hand, some jurisdictions do
not claim an interest in the plaintiffs punitive damage recovery until

ponents of this principle assert that split-recovery statutes "generate difficult problems
of application and administration, particularly for the large number of cases that are
settled out of court." James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages-Legislative Reform, 39
FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 189, 197 (1989).
279. By controlling when the state's interest in the award attaches, this provision
may affect a split-recovery statute's constitutionality. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining how a provision in the Colorado statute disavowing any state
interest prior to payment becoming due implicated the Takings Clause).
280. See Grube, supra note 13, at 875; see also Breslo, supra note 15, at 1157.
Split-recovery statutes have no effect until the court renders a punitive damages judgment against the defendant. Burrows, supra note 6, at 457-58. Thus, a plaintiff can
evade an extraction statute through early settlement of her claim. See id. By settling
for an amount between the defendant's estimated liability and the plaintiff's expected
recovery, both parties have the potential to benefit at the state's expense. See Grube,
supra note 13, at 875. Specifically, the defendant averts a potential loss of both punitive and compensatory damages while the plaintiff obtains a judgment in excess of
her expected recovery from trial. Id.
281. Jennifer O'Hearne, Comment, Compelled Participationin Innovative Pretrial
Proceedings, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 290, 290-91 (1989).
282. See Grube, supra note 13, at 875. Settlements not only create an additional
windfall to the plaintiff, but diminish the deterrence and punishment effects of punitive damages by reducing the defendant's penalty. Id.
283. This proposition is almost a necessity under a zero percent system in which
the plaintiff does not receive any percentage of a punitive damage award. See Grube,
supra note 13, at 875. Because the plaintiff receives no pecuniary benefit from a
punitive damage award, his incentive to fully litigate the punitive damage claim is
nonexistent. See id.
284. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a) (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L & R. § 8701(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1993); and OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c) (1991).

after exhaustion of the appeals process.' In the former case, the
state's attorney general becomes a party to the litigation and receives
all the rights of a judgment creditor.' Given these rights, the state
can control subsequent settlement negotiations by rejecting any proposed settlement not in the best interests of society. 7 These Timing
provisions thus allow a state to limit the plaintiffs ability to avert the
split-recovery statute by entering into socially inefficient settlement
agreements.
D. Logistical Provisions
The final provisions of a split-recovery statute are the Logistical provisions that determine whether the court informs the jury about the
split-recovery provision and whether the state takes its share in actions
in which the government is a party. Only a few states have directly
addressed whether the parties may inform the jury of the presence of
the split-recovery provisions.' While some may claim that no substantial harm results from informing the jury of these split-recovery statutes, this information is likely to inflate a jury award for two reasons.
First, civic-minded jurors are likely to award higher punitive damage
claims when they know a portion of the award advances a public purpose or increases state revenues.' Second, a jury may inflate an
award "to ensure that a specific amount will be paid to the plain-

285. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675.2 (Supp. 1992); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1331-102(4) (1989).
286. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. § 8704(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (the attorney general is given discretion to enter into settlement negotiations); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992) ("Upon issuance of judgment in such a case, the
state shall have all the rights due a judgment creditor until such judgment is satisfied
and shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff. .. ").
287. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a) (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 8701(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1993); and OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c) (1991).
288.. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(8) (West Supp. 1992) ("The jury may neither
be instructed nor informed as to the provisions of this section."); Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 781 P.2d 379, 380-81 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), affd, 797 P.2d 1019 (Or.
1990); Vincent C. Alexander, 1993 Supplemental Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CIv.
PRAc. L.& R. § 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
289. See Steven J. Sensibar, Punitive Damages: A Look at Origins and Legitimacy,
41 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 375, 387 (1991) ("If jurors realized that any punitive
damage award were to be returned to public use, the size of awards would not simply skyrocket. They would follow the Voyager spacecraft out of the solar system.").
However, some commentators suggest that juries currently award insufficient punitive
damage awards because they realize that plaintiffs already receive a windfall. Grube,
supra note 13, at 855. Therefore, telling the jury about the public's share could lead
to more efficient awards by removing some of the jury's incentive to award inefficiently low punitive damage awards to prevent total windfall recoveries. Id.
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tiff." ' In attempting to avoid these problems, only two states have
explicitly ruled on the issue. In Florida, the split-recovery statute specifically disallows any instruction about split-recovery provisions." In
Oregon, a court held that a jury instruction based on the split-recovery
statute interjected inappropriate factors into the jury's deliberation.
Although not explicitly recognized in other jurisdictions, some states
will likely follow these rulings and disallow the use of this information
in jury instructions.'
The other Logistical provision addresses actions in which the government is a party. In actions against a governmental agency, a possible
conflict of interest is created if the government receives a share of the
punitive damage award. New York is the only state to specifically
address this issue.295 The New York statute exempts any civil action
rendered against the state from the force of the statute.9 Therefore,
in those cases, a split-recovery statute does not affect the plaintiffs
punitive damage recovery.

VI.

PROPOSED SPLIT-RECOVERY STATUTE

Model Statute
§_
: Punitive Damages; split-recovery
(1)(a) In all civil actions resulting in an award of punitive damages, 50% of the
amount of punitive damages awarded in excess of $20,000 shall be remitted to a
special compensation fund designed to reimburse plaintiffs unable to collect
against insolvent defendants.
(b) Calculation and payment of a claimant's attorney fees, if payable from the

judgment, are based solely on the portion of the judgment payable to the claimant
under section (1)(a) with respect to any punitive damage recovery.
(2)(a) At no time prior to entry of judgment shall the state or any public fund
obtain an interest in the punitive damage claim, nor shall the state nor any public
fund control or influence any settlement negotiations between the parties.
(b) The fund designated in section (1)(a) becomes a judgment creditor upon

290. Alexander, supra note 288, at § 8701.
291. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(8) (West Supp. 1992).
292. HoneyweU, 781 P.2d at 380.
293. See Alexander, supra note 288, at § 8701.
294. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(noting that a potential problem develops when the conduct of the state or any of its
officers results in litigation).
295. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & R. § 8701(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
296. Id.

entry of a verdict awarding the plaintiff punitive damages.
(c) Any settlement agreement between the original parties to the action after
the verdict must remit to the designated fund the share required in section (1)(a).
The portion of the damages treated as punitive in the new agreement will be determined by the proportion of the damages treated as punitive in the original verdict
(3) If insolvency prevents the party awarded punitive damages from collecting
the outstanding compensatory and punitive damages due to that party, the designated fund takes no interest in the award until satisfaction of these unpaid debts
by the insolvent party.
(4) The jury shall not be informed or instructed of the provisions of this section.

A.

Commentary on Specific Provisions of Model Statute

As tort reformers promote new ways to distribute or limit windfall
recoveries from punitive damages and to discourage unnecessary litigation, states must consider split-recovery as a viable and necessary alternative.' While a state electing to utilize split-recovery will want to tailor their statute to its particular legislative objectives, this proposed statute is a general model that would function efficiently, equitably, and
constitutionally.
1. Identity Provisions
The first Identity provision of the model statute designates to whom
the legislature will award an interest in the plaintiffs punitive damage
recovery. Section (1)(a) designates a special compensation fund as the
recipient of the apportioned interest. Although general revenue funds are
the easiest types of funds to administer,' the proposed statute designates a special fund rather than a general governmental fund because
general governmental funds may raise constitutional concerns implicating
the Double Jeopardy Clause and Excessive Fines Clause of the Constitution.' Because an agency receives a general interest in receipts from a
general revenue fund, an award to such a fund could transform the civil

297. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (illustrating the benefits of splitrecovery).
298. Awards to general revenue funds do not generally distinguish among the goveminent agencies to receive the money or mandate how those agencies spend their
money, while special funds that restrict uses of awards cause greater administrative
burdens to the extent that such restrictions must be administered. Compare UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (general fund) with IOWA CODE § 668A.l.2.b (1991)
(civil reparations trust fund disbursing funds solely for indigent civil litigation programs or insurance assistance programs).
299. See supra notes 182-245 and accompanying text (explaining the potential constitutional concerns over awarding the collected funds to a governmental agency).
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nature of the action into one of a "criminal nature"" or "essentially
criminal.""1 By designating a special non-governmental fund to receive
the collected money, however, the legislature can avoid this transformation and prevent a successful constitutional challenge. 2 Additionally,
placing collected money into a specific fund designed to further a legitimate legislative objective is more equitable than treating the receipts as
general revenue because the nebulous nature of a general revenue fund
conceals potential benefits of the distribution and prevents the recipients
from being held specifically accountable for the distribution.'
While courts employ many different types of special fund disbursement
schemes,' 4 allocating the money to a fund designed to reimburse plaintiffs with judgments against insolvent defendants appropriately complements the rationale behind split-recovery allocation. Because one of the
main purposes of split-recovery statutes is to reduce windfall recoveries
to undeserving plaintiffs, it seems appropriate that the collected funds go
to support other plaintiffs, deserving of compensation, yet unable to collect for their injury."
The second Identity provision determines the types of cases in which a
punitive recovery will be subject to split-recovery. Section (1)(a) does
not distinguish between cases,'s instead making all civil actions applicable to split-recovery. The proposed statute favors broad application of
split-recovery statutes because such an approach is more efficient and
less likely to raise constitutional issues. First, state legislatures should

300. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
302. Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1242 (S.D. Iowa 1991) ("A clear
distinction can be made between funds that are to be placed into the state treasury
and those funds that are to be placed into a [civil fund] to be administered by the
courts."). See supra notes 182-245 and accompanying text.
303. Sloane, supra note 15, at 510 (noting that general funds are less attractive because they give the appearance that the money is "never really being put to use to
benefit the public").
304. See supra note 252 (listing the state statutes that allocate collected money to
special funds).
305. See Breslo, supra note 15, at 1140. One problem with this type of disbursement scheme is that it may lead to increased litigation by providing plaintiffs the
opportunity to bring suit and recover against insolvent defendants. However, one
could argue that the benefit to society of allowing an innocent party to collect for

actual injury suffered greatly outweighs the potential for minimal increased litigation.
306. While some statutes limit the applicability of split-recovery to certain causes of
action, others apply split-recovery to all types of civil cases. See supra notes 257-60
and accompanying text.

not limit split-recovery to certain types of actions because reducing windfall recoveries and discouraging unnecessary litigation benefits all areas
of civil litigation. 7 Second, broad application prevents the possibility
that a statute will be discriminatory and violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.'
2.

Allocation Provisions

The Allocation provisions determine the percentage of the plaintiffs
punitive damage award to extract and the timing of the deduction of
attorney's fees from this allocation.' Section (1)(a) of the proposed
statute awards the special compensation fund a fifty percent interest in
any punitive damage award in excess of $20,000.
The proper level of appropriation depends upon a balance between the
public's interest in encouraging socially beneficial litigation and its interest in reducing windfall recoveries and discouraging unnecessary litigation."' Once the plaintiff has sufficient incentive to bring suit, however, balancing competing interests becomes unnecessary because the
incentive function becomes immaterial.3" Therefore the most judicious
Allocation provision appropriates the largest percent from the punitive
damage award without offending the plaintiffs incentive to bring suit.
Although.in theory, a determination of the precise point at which this
occurs is impossible to make, a"2 this Comment proposes that a fifty per-

307. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of split-recovery).
308. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text (explaining when split-recovery
implicates the Equal Protection Clause).
309. Because of the direct relation between these provisions, one must read them
together to accurately interpret their effect. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying
text
310. For example, in cases involving minimal individual compensatory recovery or
extensive litigation costs, if the proportion extracted from the plaintiffs punitive
award is too high, society will lose the deterrent and punishment benefits of punitive
damages because the plaintiff will lack the incentive to expend the time, effort, or
money to bring the claim to justice. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, if the proportion extracted from the plaintiffs punitive award is too
low, society will lose a major part of the benefits associated with split-recovery because the plaintiff will still receive a substantial windfall recovery and the appropriation will discourage few plaintiffs from bringing unnecessary suits. See supra notes
82-95 and accompanying text.
311. Unlike the benefits of split-recovery that continuously rise as the share awarded to the public increases, the incentive benefit of awarding a share to the plaintiff
actually decreases once the plaintiffs share gives her sufficient incentive to bring
suit. In this case, any excess amounts given to the plaintiff serve to encourage others
with meritless claims to bring suit with the hope of receiving a large punitive damage recovery.
312. In practice, however, a state legislature can continuously adjust the percentage
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cent split of any punitive damage award efficiently balances these factors. Compared to current split-recovery statutes, fifty percent is a relatively high split considering that the plaintiff remains responsible for
attorneys' fees.313 Although this high percentage barely affects the incentive function of punitive damages in large recovery cases, because the
plaintiffs fifty percent share would likely cover the emotional and financial costs of bringing suit, it could affect cases involving minimal fmancial recovery.314 However, adopting the $20,000 minimum as used in the
Utah split-recovery statute alleviates this potential problem."' The high
extraction rate in the model statute would not deter small claims because the statute assures the plaintiff 100% recovery of the first $20,000
in punitive damages in any successful action. Therefore, in all cases involving punitive damages, this Allocation provision would maximize the
benefits of split-recovery while minimizing potential harm from decreasing punitive damage awards.
The second type of Allocation provision also involves a balancing of
competing factors."' Because this provision establishes when to deduct
attorneys' fees from the punitive damage award, the determination affects the ultimate recovery of both the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attor17
ney."
Therefore, the most judicious provision will balance the
plaintiffs incentive to bring suit with the attorney's incentive to take the
case.
Section (1)(b) of the proposed statute limits the claimant's attorney
from using publicly collected punitive damages to determine her contingency fee. This provision most appropriately furthers the principles of
split-recovery because the timing of such a deduction similarly discourag-

until the result is satisfactory. For example, the Florida statute initially appropriated
6096 of all punitive damage awards. Blum, supra note 17, at 3. However, after the
legislature determined that this 6096 state split did not provide enough of an incentive
for plaintiffs' attorneys to take punitive potential cases, the legislature amended the
split-recovery statute to extract only 3596 of ihe plaintiffs recovery. Id.
313. See supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
315. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) ("In any judgment where punitive
damages are awarded and paid, 5096 of the amount of the punitive damages in excess
of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state
treasury for deposit into the General Fund.").
316. The second Allocation provision involves the timing of the attorney fee deduction. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.

es attorneys and plaintiffs from undertaking inefficient litigation."s8
While the timing of this deduction reduces the incentive for the plaintiffs
attorney, her portion of the plaintiffs overall recovery should provide
sufficient incentive to take a meritorious case.319
The final Allocation provision concerns the effect of an insolvent defendant on a split-recovery statute. When a defendant is unable to pay
the entire award rendered against him, the split-recovery statute may
hinder both the plaintiffs compensatory recovery" and the plaintiffs
incentive to bring suit."I Therefore, an Allocation provision that avoids
these detrimental effects allows the split-recovery statute to function
effectively. Section (3) of the proposed statute satisfies these concerns
by limiting the ability of the designated fund to collect its share until the
plaintiff collects the outstanding compensatory and punitive damages he
is due.
3.

Timing Provisions

By determining when the public's interest in the punitive damage
award arises, the Timing provisions of a split-recovery statute control
settlement negotiations and prevent potential constitutional challenges.' First, section (2)(a) of the proposed statute provides that no state
or public fund shall obtain any interest in the punitive damage award
prior to the entry of judgment. By separating the public appropriation

318. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
319. The only facts to suggest that this percentage is appropriate to provide a
plaintiffs attorney with the incentive necessary to undertake a case can be inferred
from the Florida legislature's conclusion that a 60% deduction did not provide the
plaintiff attorneys with enough of an incentive. Blum, supra note 17, at 3 (noting that
the reduction of the state appropriation from 60% to 35% resulted from a legislative
conclusion that the statute failed to provide plaintiff attorneys with enough incentive
to bring punitive potential cases). This problem is most likely to occur in cases involving the potential for minimal financial recovery. See supra note 42. While the'
Florida

legislature

fixed

the

state

deduction

at

35%,

see

FLA.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 768.73(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992), the 50% deduction of the proposed statute should
provide enough of an incentive since it includes $20,000 of reduction-free punitive
damages. Therefore, even in cases involving minimal financial recovery, the split-recovery deduction should not overly deter plaintiff attorneys from taking worthy cases.
320. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text (explaining how split-recovery
may diminish compensatory damage recovery).
321. If the current allocation provides only the minimal amount necessary to encourage a plaintiff to bring suit, see supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text, a
split-recovery statute may reduce the incentive effect of punitive damages. By reducing the amount of the plaintiffs expected recovery by the uncollected portion of the
judgment, the split-recovery statute no longer provides the plaintiff with the proper
incentive and will deter some worthy claims from being undertaken. Id.
322. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
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from the actual litigation of the suit, this provision distances the state
from the actual litigation in order to retain the "civil" nature of the action.' Therefore, the statute avoids Double Jeopardy and Excessive
Fines objections. 4
While this Timing provision insulates split-recovery from these constitutional problems, a similar provision in the Colorado split-recovery statute led its supreme court to find that the plaintiff obtained a vested property interest in the entire award.' As such, the court held that the appropriation violated the constitutional proscription of government takings." However, the proposed statute treats the plaintiff as having no
vested right to the entire award. Section (2)(b) provides that the designated fund becomes a judgment creditor immediately upon entry of a
verdict awarding punitive damages. By immediately granting the fund
judgment creditor status, this provision expressly indicates an intent to
avoid treating the plaintiff as holding a vested interest in the entire punitive damage award. 7 Therefore, when read together, these Timing pro-

323. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text (explaining how the lack of
government involvement in instigating the punitive damage suit may insulate the splitrecovery statute from being considered criminal in nature). See also Sloane, supra
note 15, at 508 (proposing that this type of provision may distance the state from the
litigation).
Additionally, the fact that the recipient of the appropriated funds is a public
entity rather than a governmental agency also fosters the non-criminal nature of the
proposed statute. See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 185, 220 (explaining that only actions that are criminal in nature invoke the Excessive Fines and Double Jeopardy clauses of the Constitution).
Even if the Supreme Court found these statutes to be criminal in nature, the splitrecovery statute would not automatically be unconstitutional. A violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause occurs when the specific appropriation infringes upon the
plaintiffs right to be free from multiple punishment or multiple prosecution. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. Likewise, the specific appropriation will not
violate the Excessive Fines Clause unless the court determines the public's share to
be excessive. See supra notes 24243 and accompanying text.
325. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 267 (Colo. 1991) (stating that the
legislature's disavowal of any state interest in the punitive damage claim prior to
payment becoming due was "an implicit legislative acknowledgement of the property
interest created in the judgment creditor by virtue of the judgment itself"). See COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (1987).
326. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 273.
327. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting that without a provision
granting the plaintiff any vested right to recovery, the plaintiff secures no protectable
property right in the recovery of the entire punitive damage award). See also Sloane,
supra note 15, at 506 (maintaining that a split-recovery statute that immediately
grants the state a judgment creditor status upon the entry of judgment avoids impli-

visions eliminate the applicability of the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against government talngs.2
In addition to dispensing with constitutional concerns, the Timing
provisions of a split-recovery statute also affect settlement negotiations.
Although the model statute prohibits the designated fund from obtaining
any interest in a pre-judgement settlement,' section (2)(c) of the proposed statute grants the designated fund a proportionate share of any
post-judgment settlement between the original parties.' While this provision complicates the administration of settlement agreements," it
prevents parties from evading the statute by settling the case during the
appellate process simply to avoid imposition of the split-recovery allocation.' Therefore, this Timing provision prevents manifest abuse of the
legal system' and upholds the principles of split-recovery.'

cation of the Takings Clause).
328. Without infringing a protectable property right, the model statute also protects
itself against a successful due process challenge. See supra text accompanying note
145.
329. Under section (2)(a) of the proposed statute, neither the state nor any public
fund obtains any interest in the punitive damage claim prior to the entry of judgment.
330. A post-judgment settlement includes any settlement between the original parties
entered into from the time of the initial verdict through the entire appeals process.
While this provision allows the public fund to collect its share of any post-judgment settlement, section (2)(c)(1) grants the fund no right to control or influence the
settlement negotiations between the parties. Therefore, this provision is consistent
with the purpose of section (2)(a), to distance the public appropriation from the
actual litigation, and does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause or Double Jeopardy Clause. See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
331. To determine the public's share of a post-judgment settlement agreement, one
must first determine the proportionate share of the original verdict allocated to punitive damages. For example, if the original verdict awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in
damages, of which $100,000 consisted of punitive damages, the proportionate share
allocated to punitive damages would be $100,000/$150,000 or 2/3. Next, one must
multiply the total amount of the settlement by this fraction to determine the portion
of the settlement awarded for punitive damages. In the above example, if the original
parties settled the case for $75,000, the statute considers 2/3 of the settlement award,
or $50,000, as the portion of the settlement awarded as punitive damages. Therefore,
the public fund can use only this portion of the settlement to determine its share of
the post-judgment settlement agreement.
332. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
333. Without such a provision, all parties to a case involving punitive damages have
a substantial financial incentive to reach an out-of-court settlement prior to final adjudication of their suit. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. For example, in a
case involving an initial jury verdict of $20,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages, a 50% split-recovery statute without such a Timing
provision allows the plaintiff to benefit from any settlement above $70,000 (her expected recovery upon final adjudication) and allows the defendant to benefit from
any settlement below $120,000 (her expected payment upon final adjudication). There-
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4.

Logistical Provisions

While the previous types of provisions control the principle matters of
a split-recovery allocation, the final type controls the logistical aspects of
a split-recovery statute. The first Logistical provision, in section 2(a),
concerns actions to which the government is a party. In actions against a
governmental agency, a split-recovery statute may create a possible conflict of interest if the government is the recipient of a share in a punitive
damage award assessed against it.' In the proposed model statute,
however, the government receives no interest in the collected funds.
Therefore, regardless of whether the government is a party to the action,
the appropriation presents no conflict of interest problems.'
The final Logistical provision, in section (4), prohibits either party or
the court from informing or instructing the jury about the split-recovery
allocation. The purpose of this Logistical provision is to insure that this
information does not affect the jury's deliberations in assessing punitive
damages against the defendantY Because such an instruction would
create the potential for inflated punitive damage awards,' the splitrecovery statute could diminish the benefits of punitive damages by separating their assessment from their principle function as a method of providing punishment, deterrence, and incentive to sue.' Therefore, add-

fore, a settlement of $95,000 would provide each party with a $25,000 benefit while
depriving the designated public fund of its rightful share of the award.
334. By permitting the parties to deprive the designated public fund of its rightful
share, a split-recovery statute without such a Timing provision contradicts the principles of split-recovery by creating an additional windfall recovery for the plaintiff and
decreasing the punishment and deterrent effects of punitive damages on the defendant. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (conflict arises when the statute
awards the funds to the general revenue fund of the state).

336. If a state legislature elects to allocate the collected funds to a governmental
agency, a split-recovery statute can rectify the potential conflict of interest problem
by exempting all punitive damage awards rendered against the state from the appropriation. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text (noting that civic-minded jurors
may assess higher awards to advance the public purpose behind the designated fund
or may inflate an award to ensure that the plaintiff receives the full punitive damage
award initially intended).
339. Because the purposes of punitive damages are punishment, deterrence, and
incentive to sue, see supra notes 31-59 and accompanying text, an inflated award
unfairly punishes the defendant, overly deters the defendant's conduct, and provides
the plaintiff with an excessive incentive to sue.

ing this Logistical provision to a split-recovery statute protects the integrity of assessing punitive damage awards.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Punitive damages have been subject to constant criticism since their
introduction into United States jurisprudence. Opponents of punitive
damages contend that any recovery unrelated to the plaintiffs injury fosters inefficiency by promoting windfall recoveries and encouraging unnecessary litigation. Because the Supreme Court is not likely to disavow
the use of punitive damages as a method of civil recovery, those demanding change must look to alternatives.
By allocating a portion of a plaintiffs punitive damage award to the
public, split-recovery is such an alternative. Split-recovery diminishes
windfall recoveries, promotes judicious use of collected funds, and discourages unnecessary litigation. Additionally, unlike other proposed solutions, split-recovery does not substantially interfere with the three legitimate functions of punitive damages: punishment, deterrence, and incentive to sue.
While several states recently enacted split-recovery statutes to control
punitive damage recovery, the Double Jeopardy, Equal Protection, Due
Process, and Excessive Fines clauses of the Constitution stand as significant impediments to widespread acceptance. Although the Supreme
Court has yet to settle these issues, it appears that some of the current
split-recovery statutes fail constitutional scrutiny. However, if properly
drafted, a split-recovery statute can avoid these constitutional concerns
and better serve the interests of justice. Therefore, for states that seek to
address the problem of punitive damages, split-recovery may be the constitutional answer to the punitive damage dilemma.
CLAY R. STEVENS

